Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies by Weinrib, Ernest J.
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 78




Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract
Remedies
Ernest J. Weinrib
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 55 (2003).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol78/iss1/5




For corrective justice the remedy corrects the injustice suffered
by the plaintiff at the defendant's hands. In this Paper I want to
examine the implications of this simple statement for contract dam-
ages. My ultimate focus, after considerable preliminaries, will be on
two kinds of damage awards for breach of contract: punitive damages
and damages that require the disgorgement of gains. The fact that
these two kinds of damage awards have in recent years received
notable elaboration by the highest courts in Canada, England, and
Israel' attests to the continuing relevance of the issues that they raise.
My intention is to discuss these issues from the standpoint of correc-
tive justice.
Punitive damages and disgorgement stand in contrast to damages
that are compensatory. Compensatory damages measure what the
plaintiff has lost through the defendant's breach of contract. Punish-
ment and disgorgement, in contrast, focus on the defendant: punish-
ment on the outrageousness of the defendant's act, and disgorgement
on what the defendant has gained through the wrong. This contrast
between compensation on the one hand, and punishment and dis-
gorgement on the other, means that the latter two cannot be consid-
ered in isolation from the function and possible inadequacies of the
former. Recourse to punishment or disgorgement implies that private
law has legitimate remedial purposes that compensation alone cannot
* University Professor and Cecil A. Wright Professor of Law, University of Toronto. A
version of this paper was presented at the international conference on Comparative Remedies
for Breach of Contract, held at the Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University, Israel, in
June 2002. I am grateful for the comments of participants in the conference, and especially of
my commentator, Dean Ariel Porat. I would also like to thank Hanoch Dagan for his
comments.
1. Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., (2002) 209 D.L.R. (4th) 257 (S.C.C.); Attorney Gen. v. Blake,
[2000] 4 All E.R. 385 (H.L.); C.A. 20/82, Adras Bldg. Material v. Harlow & Jones 42(1) P.D.
221, translated in 3 RESTITUTION L. REV. 235 (1995) (from the Supreme Court of Israel, 1988).
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fulfill. Moreover, what constitutes punishment or disgorgement in a
particular case may be unascertainable without determining the
compensatory amount and the reason for regarding it as insufficient.
In private law, the idea that compensation is an appropriate rem-
edy is generally accepted. The award of compensation reflects the
plaintiff's entitlement to recover at least the loss that the defendant's
wrongful act has caused. More problematic is the issue of whether
the award should be limited to compensation. As the example of tort
law indicates, damages that go beyond compensation and aim at
punishment or disgorgement operate in circumscribed situations and
are subject to special, often controversial, justifications.2
Contract law, however, poses an additional difficulty. Here the
very notion of compensation is uncertain and its primacy disputed.
The standard measure of damages for breach of contract is the
expectation measure, which puts the plaintiff in the position in which
the plaintiff would have been had the contract not been breached. In
their classic article on contract damages, Fuller and Perdue denied
that this measure, which reflected the value of something that the
promisee did not yet have, was compensatory.3 Expectation damages,
they suggested, might better be viewed as having the quasi-criminal
purpose of penalizing the promisor for breaching the contract. 4 This
suggestion raises the possibility that a punitive impulse is present
even in the most routine award of contract damages. On this view,
truly compensatory assessments of contract damages are compara-
tively rare, whereas noncompensatory damages merely extend and
make more explicit the noncompensatory policies already pervasive
in contract damages.
2. For an assessment of the controversy about punitive damages in the torts context, see
Andrew Burrows, Reforming Exemplary Damages: Expansion or Abolition?, in WRONGS AND
REMEDIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 153 (Peter Birks ed., 1996). On disgorgement in
the torts context, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 1 (2000), and James Gordley, The Purpose of Awarding
Restitutionary Damages: A Reply to Professor Weinrib, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 39
(2000).
3. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46
YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936). For recent arguments that Fuller and Perdue were wrong to reject
the compensatory nature of expectation damages see Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law,
in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 118 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) [hereinafter
Benson, The Unity of Contract Law], and James Gordley, Contract Law in the Aristotelian
Tradition, in THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS, 265, 327-32 (Peter Benson ed., 2001).
Benson's essay is particularly insistent on the centrality of the challenge to a corrective justice
theory of contract law that the Fuller and Perdue account of expectation damages poses.
4. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 3, at 61.
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Contract law thus raises basic issues about the relationship be-
tween the remedy and the wrong. Among these issues are the
following: What is the nature of the contractual entitlement whose
breach the promisee seeks to remedy? What constitutes compensa-
tion for this breach? Does the promisee's contractual entitlement
justify the award of noncompensatory damages? Does the promisee's
entitlement determine and limit the remedial possibilities that arise
on breach, or are remedies the product of policies that are independ-
ent of that entitlement? Is there a conceptual boundary between
punishment and civil liability? May one who breaches a contractual
obligation retain the benefits resulting from the breach?
In this Paper I address these issues from the perspective of cor-
rective justice. Corrective justice postulates an intimate connection
between right and remedy.' The plaintiff's right and the defendant's
correlative duty are the constituents of the normative relationship
between the parties. An award of damages is the law's attempt to
undo, so far as money can, the defendant's violation of the plaintiff's
right. In corrective justice the nature of the right and its correlative
duty determines the nature of the remedy; considerations of policy
that are extraneous to the relationship of right and duty play no role.
Hence, compensatory damages, which repair the injury to the plain-
tiff's right, readily fit within corrective justice. In contrast, disgorge-
ment and punitive damages, which aim at objectives beyond the
plaintiff's entitlement, are questionable.
To examine contract damages in the light of corrective justice,
this Paper is organized as follows. I begin in Part I with a general
treatment of the role of remedies within a corrective justice frame-
work. This Part emphasizes that, so far as corrective justice is con-
cerned, the remedy makes the defendant restore (to the extent the
law can) what belongs to the plaintiff as a matter of right. I then in
Part II turn specifically to contract damages, and to the question
formulated by Fuller and Perdue6 of whether expectation damages
can be justified as compensatory in accordance with corrective justice.
Because defining the plaintiff's right is crucial to determining the
remedy for corrective justice, this question requires the elucidation of
the right infringed by a breach of contract. Drawing in Part III on
Kant's now almost forgotten discussion of this issue, I sketch the
relationship between the promisee's right to contractual performance
5. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 142-44 (1995).
6. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 3.
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and expectation damages, which give the promisee the value of that
right. The Kantian account of contractual right also casts light, as I
contend in Part IV, on the inaptness of requiring the disgorgement of
gains resulting from contract breach, despite the superficial attrac-
tiveness of preventing wrongdoers from profiting from their wrongs.
In Part V, I turn to punitive damages, addressing first the preliminary
question of how corrective justice and punishment-and the institu-
tions devoted to them-coexist, and how they are differentiated in a
legal order based on rights. Finally, I discuss the difficulties that
emerge from the elaborate but ultimately unsatisfying recent attempt
in Canada to work out a coherent treatment of punitive damages for
contract breach.
Throughout this Paper the discussion proceeds from the stand-
point of corrective justice alone. I ignore the rich and suggestive
treatments of contract damages from other perspectives.' Of course,
this will be no more convincing to adherents of these perspectives
than economic analysis is to those who are skeptical of its particular
premises. Whether one regards corrective justice as the appropriate
framework for understanding private law depends on the assessment
of arguments more comprehensive than those being presented here. 8
My purpose in this Paper is modest: to exhibit the implications of the
corrective justice framework-which is already well-established in
academic discussion of tort law-for a series of interconnected issues
concerning contract damages.9
This modest purpose, however, serves larger ends. Corrective
justice claims to be a normative framework for private law that is
both immanent and critical.10 It is immanent in that, by highlighting
the correlative structure of the parties' relationship, it captures the
7. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (2000);
Hanoch Dagan, Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: An Exercise in Private Law
Theory, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 115 (2000); William S. Dodge, The Case for
Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629 (1999).
8. See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 5. For an overview of corrective justice, see Ernest J.
Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349 (2002) [hereinafter Weinrib,
In a Nutshell].
9. On the unsoundness of identifying corrective justice with tort law only, see Ernest J.
Weinrib. Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN THE LAW 107, 156 (2001). The most detailed contemporary
attempt to apply corrective justice to contract law is found in the work of Peter Benson. See
Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract:
Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077 (1989); Peter Benson,
The Idea of a Public Basis of Justification for Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 273 (1995);
Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, supra note 3, at 118.
10. WEINRIB, supra note 5, at 8-21.
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most pervasive and distinctive feature of private law. It is critical
because it views this feature as crucial to the fairness and coherence
of private law relationships, and therefore insists that it must inform
the justifications for particular doctrines and institutions. Because
fairness and coherence are themselves aspirations internal to any
well-ordered system of private law, corrective justice does not exist
independently of the ensemble of private law doctrines and institu-
tions that make it a juridical reality. Theoretical argument is there-
fore not sufficient to establish its significance. Also required is
attention to particular doctrines and institutions, to the role that
corrective justice can play in reflecting or developing fair and coher-
ent norms of private law, and to the difficulties that arise when the
analysis of private law invokes considerations that are inconsistent
with it. The discussion of contract damages that follows is offered in
this spirit.
I. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND PRIVATE LAW REMEDIES
Corrective justice views the remedy imposed on the defendant as
correcting the injustice suffered by the plaintiff." This corrective
function requires that the remedy follow in the tracks of, and undo,
the injustice that calls it into being. The injustice and the remedy
must have the same structure.
Given that the liability of a particular defendant is necessarily a
liability to a particular plaintiff, the defining characteristic of this
common structure is that the parties are correlatively situated. An
award of damages evinces this correlativity by linking the defendant's
obligation to pay and the plaintiff's entitlement to receive the sum
awarded. This correlative treatment of the parties at the remedial
stage presupposes that, in finding the defendant liable to the plaintiff,
the law considers the parties not as independent monads, but as the
doer and sufferer of the same injustice. The remedy is then the
correlatively structured response to a correlatively structured injus-
tice.
Liability is a fair and coherent phenomenon only to the extent
that the justifications that support it in a given case simultaneously
embrace both parties as correlatively situated. Then a reason for
considering the defendant to have done an injustice is also a reason
for considering the plaintiff to have suffered that injustice. Other-
11. See generally Weinrib, In a Nutshell, supra note 8.
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wise, liability would reflect a congeries of considerations that apply to
the parties individually without reflecting their reciprocal relation-
ship. Such incoherently one-sided justifications favour or disfavour
one of the parties relative to the other, and thereby fail to be fair
from the standpoint of both.
At the heart of corrective justice's correlativity are the plaintiff's
right and the defendant's corresponding duty. A right is an inherently
correlative notion, since it immediately places someone else under an
obligation not to interfere with it. Right and duty are correlated
when the plaintiff's right is the basis of the defendant's duty and,
conversely, when the scope of the duty includes the kind of right
infringement that the plaintiff suffered. Under those circumstances
the reasons that justify the protection of the plaintiff's right are the
same as the reasons that justify the existence of the defendant's duty.
Accordingly, the injustice that liability rectifies consists of the de-
fendant's having or doing something that is incompatible with a right
of the plaintiff. The law remedies this incompatibility by requiring
that the defendant restore, either specifically or by giving the equiva-
lent value, what is rightfully the plaintiff's. The subjection of the
defendant to this remedy for the plaintiff's benefit nullifies (so far as
the law can do so) the injustice that that the plaintiff suffers at the
defendant's hand. In this way corrective justice is a unifying notion
that links both the plaintiff to the defendant and the injustice to the
remedy.
The role of the remedy in corrective justice is simply to undo the
injustice between the parties. When the defendant has or does
something that is inconsistent with the plaintiff's right, that right does
not disappear but survives in a remedial form that requires the
defendant to restore what the plaintiff has been unjustly deprived of.
Just as the plaintiff has an entitlement to the substantive right that the
defendant has infringed, so the plaintiff has an entitlement as against
the defendant to the remedy that vindicates that right. Conversely,
just as the defendant has a duty not to interfere with the plaintiff's
right, so the defendant, on breaching that duty, is obligated to restore
the content of the right or its value to the plaintiff. The relationship
of right and correlative duty at the remedial stage is therefore only
[Vol 78:55
2003] PUNISHMENT AND DISGORGEMENTAS CONTRACT REMEDIES 61
the continuation of the relationship of right and correlative duty that
existed prior to the injustice 2
This internal connection between the right and the remedy pre-
cludes instrumental conceptions of remedial policy. From the stand-
point of corrective justice the remedial issue never involves inquiring
into the prospective disadvantage to be imposed on the defendant in
order to achieve a desirable social goal-even if the social goal in
question is the protection of the plaintiff's right or the deterrence of
defendants from infringing such rights upon. 3 Questions that attend
either to the deterrence of defendants or to the protection of plain-
tiffs focus on one or the other of the parties and thus fail to capture
the correlativity of their situations. Instead, corrective justice re-
quires only that one ask what remedy would undo the injustice to the
extent that the law can. To be sure, the answer to this question
requires further argumentation within the legal system (for example,
should there be specific relief or damages?). However, this argumen-
tation, far from being one-sidedly attentive as a matter of policy,
merely specifies, within the repertoire of considerations at play in a
particular legal system, what undoing the injustice amounts to in the
circumstances. Because the injustice is correlatively structured, the
remedy that undoes it follows in its tracks, reversing it for both
parties. So conceived, the remedy is constitutive of the relationship
between the doer and the sufferer of injustice, rather than instrumen-
tal to the promotion of specific social goals.
Accordingly, the function of the remedy within corrective justice
can be formulated positively and negatively. Positively, the remedy
consists of the restoration by the defendant (so far as the law can
achieve it) of what rightly belongs to the plaintiff, thereby undoing
the injustice suffered by the plaintiff at the defendant's hands.
Negatively, determination of the remedy is not the instrumental
operation of a remedial policy designed to secure particular behavior
on the part of the defendant or to achieve particular protections for
the plaintiff. Rather the remedy is merely the continuation at the
12. A similar notion appears in what German legal textbooks call Rechtsfortsetzungsge-
danke, the idea that "the injured right lives on in a claim for damages." See WALTER VAN
GERVAN ET al., COMMON LAW OF EUROPE CASEBOOKS: TORT LAW 753 (2000)
13. The fact that deterrence does not determine any particular remedy so far as corrective
justice is concerned does not mean that corrective justice is indifferent to deterrence. Deter-
rence can nonetheless, even from the standpoint of corrective justice, be a function of the
operation of the ensemble of norms and remedies as a system of positive law. For elaboration
of this point, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 UCLA L. REV. 621
(2002).
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remedial stage of the correlativity of right and duty that defines the
parties' relationship. Therefore, the first step in specifying the
plaintiff's remedy against the defendant is to identify the right of the
plaintiff and the correlative duty incumbent on the defendant.
II. THE PROBLEM OF EXPECTATION DAMAGES
What, then, is the nature of a contractual right and how does an
award of damages undo the violation of that right? The basic rule of
contract damages is that damages are awarded on the expectation
measure: the plaintiff is to be put in the position that the plaintiff
would have been in had the contract not been breached. Is there (as
corrective justice requires) an internal connection between what the
promisee has unjustly lost and what the award of expectation dam-
ages restores? In other words, do expectation damages conform to
corrective justice?
This question was the starting point of the celebrated article on
contract damages by Fuller and Perdue, who answered it in the
negative. 14 In their view the purpose of corrective justice is "the
maintenance of an equilibrium of goods among members of soci-
ety." 5 This the law accomplishes by awarding compensatory damages
"to heal a disturbed status quo. ' 16 In the contracts context, corrective
justice can be seen to be at work in the protection accorded to the
restitution and reliance interests; the equilibrium of goods repre-
sented by the status quo has been disturbed in the former both by a
gain for the defendant and an identical loss for the plaintiff, and in the
latter by a loss for the plaintiff. Expectation damages, they argue, are
different. Such damages protect a future expectancy-"something
[the plaintiff] never had"-rather than a loss already suffered. "This
seems on the face of things a queer kind of 'compensation.""' 7 And so
they contend that "[i]n passing from compensation for change of
position to compensation for loss of expectancy we pass.., from the
realm of corrective justice to that of distributive justice."' 8
Having discarded corrective justice, Fuller and Perdue then lo-
cate the rationale for expectation damages in considerations of policy.
They suggest that expectation damages are an effective means of
14. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 3.
15. Id. at 56.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 53.
18. Id. at 56.
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protecting the reliance interest.19 Expectation damages function not
only as compensation for reliance losses (for reliance can consist of
loss of the opportunity to enter other contracts) but also as a quasi-
penal prophylaxis against breaches of contract that occasion reliance
losses.20 Moreover, expectation damages promote and facilitate
business agreements, which in turn stimulate economic activity,
especially within a credit economy.21 In this way expectation damages
attest, in their view, to the intertwining of legal institutions and the
economic system.22
The Fuller-Perdue account of expectation damages stands at the
confluence of two conclusions. The first is that corrective justice,
although appropriate for rectifying the gains and losses associated
with the restitution and reliance interests, is inapplicable to the award
of expectation damages. The second is that expectation damages are
to be justified in terms of remedial policies concerning the indirect
protection of the reliance interest and the promotion of commerce in
a credit economy. These two conclusions are related. Having rejected
the applicability of corrective justice, which internally connects the
injustice to the remedy, Fuller and Perdue have recourse to consid-
erations of remedial policy that present expectation damages as
instrumental to the desirable social goals of protecting reliance and
facilitating business agreements.
The basic presupposition of this account is that corrective justice
does not operate in the absence of a disturbance of the status quo's
equilibrium of goods among members of society. Unless there is a
loss (as occurs with detrimental reliance) or a gain or both (as when
the restitution interest is in play), an award of damages cannot be
construed as the working of corrective justice. Expectation damages,
Fuller and Perdue argue, are not truly compensatory: by breaching
the promise, the defendant merely withdraws a future good without
inflicting a present loss.23 Only when the plaintiff relies on the
prospect of receiving this good and thereby puts the future to some
present detrimental use does the plaintiff suffer a loss that grounds a
claim for compensation. 24 Of course, by awarding expectation dam-
19. Id. at 60-61.
20. Id. at 61.
21. Id. at 61-62.
22. Id. at 63.
23. Id. at 53, 56.
24. Id. at 59-60.
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ages the law signals its willingness to treat the promise as creating
something of present value.2 5 But one cannot deduce the justification
of expectation damages as compensating for the loss of a present
value from their mere existence. Apart from policies like the protec-
tion of reliance and the promotion of commerce (so Fuller and
Perdue claim), there is no argument, independent of a circular appeal
to the consequences that the law attaches to a breach, for regarding
the promise as creating a present right in the expectancy. 6 In and of
itself, they assume, a contractual undertaking does not suffice to do
SO.
Crucial to this reasoning is the idea that contract law as such does
not transfer the subject matter of the contract to the promisee. If
contract law did so, expectation damages would lose their mystery:
given that the subject matter of the contract would belong to the
promisee, its value would of course determine the level of compensa-
tion owed when the promisor withholds it through breach. Since
Roman times, however, the law has distinguished between contract
and conveyance.27 At common law, only specific kinds of contracts,
such as contracts of sale, effect an immediate transfer of title. Thus a
mere agreement to sell (as contrasted with a contract of sale) does not
give the purchaser a property interest in the object to be sold, but
only the expectation of owning such an object in the future. Yet if the
vendor breaches, the purchaser is nonetheless, under the rule of
expectation damages, entitled to be put into the position that would
have obtained had he or she secured the object's value. This seems
strange. Usually one's entitlement to the value of something stems
from one's ownership of the thing that has that value 8 The rule of
expectation damages thus presents a paradox. By requiring that the
promisor make good the value withheld through the breach of the
contract, the law treats the promisee as entitled to the object's present
value even though it does not yet regard the promisee as owner of the
object itself. The fact that expectation damages do not undo the
deprivation of property to which the promisee is presently entitled
allows Fuller and Perdue to reject the notion that such damages
perform a compensatory function in accordance with corrective
25. Id. at 59.
26. Id. at 59-60.
27. BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 103 (1962).
28. In Hegel's succinct formulation, "[a]s the full owner of the thing, I am the owner both
of its value and of its use." G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 63
(Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge University Press 1991) (1821).
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justice. In effect, Fuller and Perdue argue that contract law's disjunc-
tion of value from ownership can be explained only in terms of the
independent social goals that the award of value tends to serve.
III. KANT ON CONTRACTUAL ENTITLEMENT
Centuries ago Immanuel Kant provided a response to the kind of
challenge posed more recently by Fuller and Perdue. From the
standpoint of corrective justice, Kant's views about contractual
entitlement are particularly germane. Whereas corrective justice
highlights the structure of correlativity that informs the rights and
duties of private law, Kant's account of law provides a philosophical
exposition of the normative significance of these rights and duties.29
More specifically, Kant's treatment of contract law suggests why
contractual performance can be seen as an entitlement, for the loss of
which the promisee can demand compensation.
In Kant's understanding, law as a normative phenomenon con-
sists in the sum of conditions under which the action of one person
can coexist with the freedom of another.30 Because he conceives of
freedom as the capacity for self-determining action, he views persons
as being juridically related to one another through categories of
private law that reflect their interaction as self-determining agents.
From this standpoint a person's actions are limited only by the
freedom of other self-determining agents, and rights are the juridical
manifestations of that freedom. One can therefore posit a categorical
difference between self-determining agents, who are the bearers of
rights, those objects (Kant calls them "external objects
of... choice")31 on which agents can exercise their self-determining
capacity and accordingly make into the subject matter of rights. Kant
locates promises among these external objects of choice. 32
Kant postulates that entitlements to external objects of choice
must be possible from a juridical standpoint, because such entitle-
ments are capable of coexisting with the freedom of everyone. 33 In
view of the categorical distinction between self-determining agents
29. On the relationship of corrective justice and Kantian right, see WEINRIB, supra note 5,
at 84-113; Weinrib, supra note 9, at 119-26 (2001).
30. IMMANUEL KANT, The Metaphysics of Morals, in THE CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF THE
WORKS OF IMMANUEL KANT-PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 387 [6:230] (Mary J. Gregor ed. &
trans., 1996) (1797).
31. Id. at 402 [6:247].
32. Id.
33. Id. at 404-06 [6:246-47] (postulate of practical reason with regard to rights).
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and external objects, use of the latter cannot as such, that is, inde-
pendently of a regime of rights in external objects, count as an
interference with the freedom of the former. External objects must
therefore be available for use by self-determining agents. However,
because freedom within the juridical order refers to the capacity for
self-determining agency, the aspect of choice that is relevant to
external objects of choice is this capacity, not its actual exercise.
Accordingly, the juridical possibility of using an external object of
choice must consist not merely in a liberty existing at the moment of
actual use or possession (such a liberty would reflect the actual
exercise of choice rather than the capacity for choice), but in a right
that certifies one's entitlement to the external object even when one
is not using or possessing it. The consequence of this is that one can
be wronged by another's use of something that one does not actually
possess. This consequence is simply what having a right in an exter-
nal object means. Thus, in a legal order that reflects the relations of
freedom between self-determining agents, the possibility of rights to
external objects of choice cannot be denied.
Included among these external objects of choice is contractual
performance by another. In accordance with the very distinction
between self-determining agency and objects external to it, anything
can be an external object of choice. External objects of choice are
categorically different from the self-determining agent who can
exercise choice. As Kant puts it, "external" means "distinct from
me," not merely "found in another location ... in space or time.''34
Indeed, if this were not so, one would think-wrongly, in view of the
independence of right from actual possession-that a right required
actual possession at a particular time and place. Accordingly, exter-
nal objects of choice are not merely corporeal things that are spatially
external; they can include another's promised performance.
For Kant, this establishes contractual performance as the possi-
ble content of a right. Whether a person in fact has such a right
depends on whether the rightful conditions for its creation have been
observed.35 These conditions give legal expression to the notion that
the promisee's right to contractual performance is the product of the
wills of both promisee and promisor. The contract effects a voluntar-
ily assumed change in the pre-existing legal relationship between the
contracting parties, creating a contractual right in the promisee and
34. Id. at 401[6:245].
35. Id. at 422-23 [6:272-73].
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imposing a correlative duty on the promisor. Accordingly, both of
them must participate in its creation. Doctrines of contract forma-
tion, which engage the two parties in relation to each other, are the
legal categories through which this process of joint creation occurs. 36
Kant is explicit about the nature of the right that emerges from
this process. It is not a right to the subject matter of the contract.
Nor is it a right to the situation that would result from the perform-
ance of the promised act. Rather, it is a right merely to the perform-
ance of that act, to what Kant calls "another's choice to perform a
specific deed. 37  Kant formulates this important conclusion as
follows:
By a contract I acquire something external. But what is it that I
acquire? Since it is only the causality of another's choice with re-
spect to the performance he has promised me, what I acquire di-
rectly by a contract is not an external thing but rather his deed, by
which that thing is brought under my control so that I make it mine.
- By a contract I therefore acquire another's promise (not what he
promised), and yet something is added to my external belongings; I
have become enriched (locupletior) by acquiring an active obliga-
tion on the freedom and means of the other.38
Thus, Kant continues, what the promisee acquires through a contract
is not a right to a thing but a right against the specific person obli-
gated to perform the requisite act.39
36. For an extended account of how the common law doctrines of contract formation treat
the parties as mutually related within a corrective justice framework, see Benson, The Unity of
Contract Law, supra note 3, at 118.
37. KANT, supra note 30, at 402 [6:247].
38. Id. at 424 [6:273].
39. In Kant's view, the acquisition of a thing by means of a contract involves two concep-
tual steps: the contract that makes a certain act (delivery of the thing) obligatory, and then the
delivery that accomplishes the transfer of property by putting the promisee into possession of
the thing. Id. at 424-26 [6:274-76]. While it is true that the contract to deliver something
makes the promisee's acquisition of the subject matter of the contract a "rightfully necessary
result of it," that result is the consequence of the promisor's discharge of the obligation, not "a
part of the contract," that is, not constitutive of the obligation itself. Id. at 432 [6:284]. Kant is
following a principle of Roman law that survived in Germany, that the contract of sale (emptio
venditio) does not itself transfer property; that happens only through a subsequent conveyance,
such as delivery (traditio). See FRITZ SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 526-33 (1951). In
holding this view, Kant implicitly disagreed with Grotius and Pufendorf, both of whom rejected
the principle of Roman Law that contract does not convey property. See 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE
JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 308-09 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925); SAMUEL
PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO 610-11 (Oldfather trans., 1934).
Whether a contract of sale transfers property is a question that different legal systems answer
differently. See F. DE ZULUETA, THE ROMAN LAW OF SALE 1-2 (1945); REINHARD
ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN
TRADITION 271-72 (1990). In the common law, for instance, passage of title is precisely what
distinguishes a contract of sale from an agreement to sell. Of course, the fact that property can
be passed through certain contracts about things means that not every contract does so.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
This Kantian account of contractual entitlement provides a basis
for the expectation measure of damages. By breaching the contract,
the defendant unjustly deprives the plaintiff of the performance to
which the plaintiff is entitled. The law undoes that injustice by
restoring to the plaintiff either the specific performance that has been
lost or the value of that performance. This value, in turn, reflects the
value of the subject matter of the contract. Hence, the plaintiff is
entitled to damages that put the plaintiff into the position that the
plaintiff would have been in had the contract not been breached.
This is so not because the plaintiff has acquired an entitlement to (in
Kant's formulation) "what was promised," 4 that is, the thing that was
the subject matter of the contract, but rather because the plaintiff has
acquired the promise itself,4' that is, the act that the defendant is
obligated to perform. The value of the thing promised is merely a
way of measuring the value of the promise itself. The plaintiff has not
acquired the thing promised "directly," as Kant notes, 42 but the thing
figures indirectly in the plaintiff's entitlement because the entitle-
ment's value reflects the value of the thing.
This account addresses the perplexity later raised by Fuller and
Perdue, that expectation damages seem to be "a queer kind of
'compensation'' in that they give the plaintiff something that the
plaintiff never had.43 It is true that the plaintiff never had the thing
promised; its loss is therefore not something for which the plaintiff
can rightly claim compensation. But the plaintiff did have an entitle-
ment to the performance itself; it is for the infringement of this
entitlement that expectation damages compensate. Kant thereby
answers the question of how can the law treat the plaintiff as entitled
to the thing's value if the plaintiff is not entitled to the thing. The
plaintiff turns out to be entitled to the thing's value because that
value determines the value of the performance to which the plaintiff
is entitled. Both the Kantian account and the Fuller-Perdue critique
of expectation damages presuppose the disjunction between contrac-
tual performance and ownership of the subject matter of the contract.
But this very feature of contract that is problematic for Fuller and
Accordingly, these differences in the positive law of various legal systems do not affect Kant's
fundamental point, that the passage of property is not conceptually integral to the idea of
contractual entitlement.
40. KANT, supra note 30, at 402 [6:248] (emphasis removed).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 424 [6:273].
43. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 3, at 53.
[Vol178:55
2003] PUNISHMENT AND DISGORGEMENTAS CONTRACT REMEDIES 69
Perdue is what for Kant characterizes contract as creating a distinct
kind of right.
In what sense does Kant provide, as Fuller and Perdue sought, a
justification for the rule about expectation damages? For Fuller and
Perdue, justification consists in identifying the social purposes that
the rule serves-a conception of justification they regard as so well-
established that it "would today scarcely be regarded as an exciting
truth."44 Therefore, once they dismiss the suggestion that expectation
damages maintain the equilibrium of goods among members of
society, they are free to rummage through the repertoire of social
purposes until they alight on the protection of reliance and the
promotion of commerce. 45 Kant, in contrast, working in the tradition
of corrective justice, does not justify legal concepts by reference to a
social purpose, because that would involve the law's treating the
parties as means rather than as agents who interact as ends in them-
selves. Instead, Kant views justification as immanent in a system of
rights. Because a system of rights requires that the action of one self-
determining person be consistent with the freedom of another, 46 a rule
is justified simply inasmuch as it manifests this consistency. Con-
versely, a restriction of self-determining activity for any reason except
consistency with the freedom of others (for example, a refusal to give
legal recognition to contractual entitlement) would eo ipso be unjusti-
fied. Thus, once a rule can be understood as the juridical manifesta-
tion of self-determining agency, no further work remains for
justification to do. The rule is justified by virtue of its expressing the
self-determining freedom of the interacting parties. This freedom
forms the baseline from which deviations count as injustices.47 And
then the undoing of such injustices in accordance with corrective
44. Id. at 52.
45. Id. at 62.
46. KANT, supra note 30, at 387 [6:230].
47. Richard Craswell has claimed that "[wihile corrective justice theory can give us a way
of talking about what to do when the relevant baseline is infringed, it cannot tell us what
baseline ought to be selected as relevant." Craswell, supra note 7, at 127. In different contexts,
Hanoch Dagan and Peter Cane develop a similar criticism of corrective justice. See Hanoch
Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98 MICH. L. REV. 138 (1999); Peter
Cane, Distributive Justice and Tort Law, 1 N.Z.L. REv. 401 (2001). The Kantian account of
contractual entitlement illustrates the unsoundness of the contention that corrective justice
cannot itself supply the baseline from which to reckon unjust gains and losses. For more general
treatments of entitlements in corrective justice, see Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice
and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515, 578-601 (1992); Ernest J. Weinrib,
The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice, 44 DUKE L.J. 277 (1994).
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justice partakes of the normativeness immanent in the system of
rights and duties as a whole.
A virtue of the Kantian account of contractual entitlement is that
it is consonant with the compensatory function that law itself implic-
itly assigns to expectation damages. In awarding the plaintiff the
value of what the contract would have given, the law treats promisees
as entitled to the expectancy that the breach deprives from them. In
contrast, a long and complicated narrative-which Fuller and Perdue
attempted to provide-is needed to divert expectation damages from
their ostensibly compensatory role to the remedial policies identified
by Fuller and Perdue. It is, accordingly, hardly surprising that,
although the classification of interests that Fuller and Perdue offered
has taken hold, their account of expectation damages and the recon-
ceptualization of contract law that this account entails have, on the
whole, had little effect on the law.48 The interest in securing the
promised performance or its equivalent remains "the only pure
contractual interest. '49 This interest in performance as the distinctive
feature of contractual entitlement is the focus of Kant's attention. In
providing a theoretical account that allows us to understand expecta-
tion damages for what they purport to be, that is, as compensation to
the plaintiff for an injustice suffered at the defendant's hands, Kant's
treatment of contract exemplifies the commitment of corrective
justice to understand the basic structure of private law in the law's
own terms. 0
IV. THE DISGORGEMENT OF GAINS FROM BREACH
Whereas expectation damages, whatever their proper theoretical
basis, are well-established in the law, awards based on the defendant's
gains are more controversial. The renewed interest in restitution
throughout the common law world has brought new attention to-
and controversy about the principles that should govern-gains from
contract breach." This topic has been called "devilishly difficult."52
48. Daniel Friedmann, The Performance Interest in Contract Damages, 111 LAW Q. REV.
628, 646-54 (1995).
49. Id. at 629.
50. On this commitment, see WEINRIB, supra note 5, at 1-21.
51. Among the leading treatments are JAMES EDELMAN, GAIN-BASED DAMAGES:
CONTRACT, TORT, EQuITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 149-89 (2002); Peter Birks,
Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: Snepp and the Fusion of Law and Equity, 1987
LLOYDS MAR. AND COM. L.Q. 421; Dagan, supra note 7; E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or
My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339
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Favoring gain-based awards are strong ethical intuitions that promises
should be kept and that those who breach their contracts should not
profit from their wrongs. On the other hand, the difficulty in working
out a coherent formulation of a new gain-based principle reinforces
the suspicion that the traditional approach may be justified after all.
In many contract situations gain-based awards lie at the margins
of the law's traditional compensatory framework. One such situation
occurs when the defendant's gains may be used as a means of measur-
ing the plaintiff's losses. For example, when the defendant competes
with a plaintiff to whom the defendant has given an exclusive license
to sell or manufacture a certain commodity, the usual approach is to
treat the defendant's gain as evidence of the profit that the plaintiff
lost through the breach. 3 Another such situation occurs when
defective performance saves the promisor an expenditure without
ultimately causing the promisee a further loss. Then the promisee can
deduct what the promisor saved from the agreed price in order to
bring the payment into line with what the promisee received, thus
preventing what turns out to be an overpayment. 54 Yet another such
situation occurs when the promisor builds in breach of a negative
covenant with the promisee but without causing the promisee finan-
cial loss. The promisee's entitlement to receive, in lieu of an injunc-
tion, the amount that reasonably would have had to been paid for
securing a relaxation of the covenant can be interpreted either as
gain-based or as compensatory.55 A fourth such situation occurs when
(1985); Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of
Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504 (1980) [hereinafter Friedmann,
Restitution of Benefits]; Daniel Friedmann, Restitution for Wrongs: The Measure of Recovery, 79
TEX. L. REV. 1879 (2001); William Goodhart, Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract:
The Remedy that Dare not Speak Its Name, 3 RESTITUTION L. REV. 3 (1995); Gareth Jones, The
Recovery of Benefits Gained from a Breach of Contract, 99 LAW Q. REV. 443 (1983); Andrew
Kull, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1465 (1994); Richard
O'Dair, Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract and the Theory of Efficient Breach:
Some Reflections, 46 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 113 (1993); Lionel D. Smith, Disgorgement of the
Profits of Breach of Contract: Property, Contract and "Efficient Breach", 24 CAN. BUS. LAW J.
121 (1994-95); S. M. Waddams, Profits Derived from Breach of Contract: Damages or Restitu-
tion, 11 J. CONT. L. 115 (1997).
52. Andrew Burrows, No Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract (Surrey C.C. v.
Breden Homes), 1993 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 453.
53. John P. Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 189 (1959).
54. Samson & Samson, Ltd. v. Proctor, [1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. 655 (S.C.) (builder, in breach of
building contract, puts insufficient steel reinforcing into house which is sold at a price undimin-
ished by the defect; court holds that a deduction from the contract price is not a departure from
the fundamental principle of compensation); see also Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [2000] 4 All E.R.
385, at 398 (H.L.).
55. Wrotham Park Estate v. Parkside Homes, [19741 1 W.L.R. 798 (Ch.). See the different
interpretations of this case in Blake, [2000] 4 All E.R. 385, at 395-97, 410.
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the breach of contract is also the breach of a fiduciary duty. The
aggrieved beneficiary can secure an accounting of the fiduciary's
profits, which would have been unavailable from a mere breach of
contract.
5 6
Are such miscellaneous instances of gain-based recovery to be
understood, not as particular applications of traditional categories,
but as the scattered embers of a general conception of gain-based
damages, to be collected and fanned into a new and explicit principle
of disgorgement for breach of contract? For the latter possibility, an
attractive analogy from the law of torts beckons. For centuries the
owner of an object that the defendant converted and sold has been
able, by "waiving the tort," to recover the proceeds of the sale from
the defendant, even when this would give the owner more than the
value of the lost object.5 7 Thus, the gain-based award that is contro-
versial for breach of contract is well-established for the misappropria-
tion of property. This difference, one might suppose, is entirely a
product of history rather than reason. For why should profiting from
another's contractual right be treated less severely than profiting
from another's proprietary right?
In recent years two important cases, one from Israel and the
other from England, have provided the most extensive discussions
favoring the disgorgement of gains from contract breach. In Adras
Building Material v. Harlow & Jones58 the defendant had agreed to
sell steel to the plaintiff, but when the price of steel spiked, the
defendant instead sold the steel stored for that purpose to a third
party. Because the plaintiff did not purchase substitute steel at a
higher price before the market receded to its former level, no loss was
proven. The Supreme Court of Israel awarded the plaintiff the gain
that the defendant realized by selling its steel to the third party above
the contract price. In Attorney General v. Blake 9 a former employee
56. Farnsworth, supra note 51, at 1354-60. For an account of the fiduciary duty from the
standpoint of corrective justice, see Weinrib, supra note 2, at 33-34.
57. Lamine v. Dorrell, 92 Eng. Rep. 303 (K.B. 1705); see Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits,
supra note 51; GRAHAM VIRGO, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 473-97 (1999).
58. C.A. 20/82, Adras Bldg. Material v. Harlow & Jones 42(1) P.D. 221 (1988), translated in
3 RESTITUTION L. REV. 235 (1995); see Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Profits Gained by
Party in Breach of Contract, 104 LAW Q. REV. 383 (1988).
59. [2000] 4 All E.R. 385. The parallel case in the United States, Snepp v. United States,
445 U.S. 507 (1980), differs in that the promisor in Snepp was held to be a fiduciary. On the
other hand, it is hard to resist the impression that, in ordering the disgorgement, the court in
Blake was aiming not merely at the promisor's breach of contract in publishing his memoirs, but
at the traitorous activities that gave him the notoriety that made his memoirs profitable-an
aspect not present in Snepp.
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of the intelligence service, who had been convicted of spying and had
escaped from prison, breached his contract of employment with the
Crown by publishing his memoirs. Although he was not a fiduciary
and the published information was no longer confidential, the House
of Lords held that the Crown was entitled to the money owed to him
by the publisher, on the ground that in the circumstances the Crown
had a legitimate interest in preventing him from profiting from his
breach of contract.
The basis of disgorgement in such cases is the sentiment that one
should not profit from one's wrong. This sentiment has obvious
moral resonance. It treats the breach of contract as a wrong, that is,
as an act that the promisor was morally obliged not to commit. By
striking the gains of contract breach from the hand of the promisor,
disgorgement gives teeth to the long-standing principle that promises
are to be observed (pacta sunt servanda).
In this respect disgorgement is at odds with the notion of effi-
cient breach. Efficient breach, a dominant idea in the economic
approach to contract theory, postulates that a contract breach from
which the promisor gains more than the value of the promisee's
expectancy is economically efficient.60 By allowing the promisor to
gain more than would be sufficient to redress the promisee's loss, the
breach moves the subject matter of the contract to its most valued
use. In this way, the self-interested preferences of the parties tend to
the production of the greatest social good. From the economic point
of view, therefore, no reason exists for the law to discourage such a
breach. Conversely, requiring the promisor to disgorge gains made
through the breach removes the incentive for the promisor to engage
in this wealth-maximizing step. 61
How do these matters stand from the perspective of corrective
justice? Corrective justice of course has no more interest in the
promotion of efficiency than it has in the promotion of any other goal
60. A clear formulation of this much discussed notion appears in RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 131-34 (5th ed. 1998). For a recent treatment see David W.
Barnes, The Anatomy of Contract Damages and Efficient Breach Theory, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 397 (1997-98).
61. Of course, the parties could bargain to split the gain realized through the breach. Such
bargaining, however, with its attendant transaction costs, would go to the distribution of the
surplus generated by the breach rather than to the breach's wealth-maximizing quality.
Economic analysis would have to compare the transactions costs of bargaining with the
transactions cost of litigation for breach and consider the relation between bargaining and
default rules. On these issues see Barnes, supra note 60, at 401-03; Dodge, supra note 7, at 663-
89.
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extrinsic to the interaction of the parties as the doer and sufferer of
an injustice.6 Indeed, the theory of efficient breach conceptualizes
the breach of contract not as an injustice to the promisee, but as an
option available to the promisor within the system of incentives that
the law makes available for the forwarding of efficiency. Under the
economic approach, the breach of contract is simply a way of channel-
ing resources to their most valued use; the normative status of a
contract as creative of an obligation on the promisor plays no role. In
contrast, corrective justice shares with the disgorgement principle the
supposition that breach of contract is a wrong.
On the other hand, disgorgement involves the following difficulty
from the standpoint of corrective justice. The fact that the promisor
has profited from committing a wrong appears to supply an intuitively
plausible reason for requiring the promisor to surrender the gain, but
not for transferring that gain to the promisee. The taint that attaches
to the promisor's gain by the wrongful manner of its acquisition does
not in itself make the promisee rather than someone else the justified
recipient of that gain. To be sure, the gain was realized through a
breach of contract with the promisee, but the question that corrective
justice raises is whether this breach establishes not merely the histori-
cal origin of the gain-its cause in fact, to use tort terminology-but
also the normative connection between the gain and the promisee's
entitlement to it.63 This normative connection is present only when
the gain represents something to which the promisee had a right of
which he or she was deprived by the promisor's wrongful act. Only
then would the gain be a constituent of the rights and correlative
duties obtaining between the parties, and only then would the award
of the gain render unto the promisee what was the promisee's. It is
not immediately apparent, however, on what grounds the gain can be
considered an entitlement of the plaintiff.
Nor does it suffice for corrective justice that disgorgement en-
courages promisors to abide by their contracts, which are corrective
justice obligations. This instrumental consideration still contains no
justification for awarding the gain specifically to the plaintiff, since
the effect on defendants would be achieved regardless of who got the
gain. Moreover, as noted above in Part I, corrective justice abjures all
instrumentalism, including that committed in its own name. Thus, the
62. See discussion supra Part I.
63. On the difference between historical and normative connection, see Weinrib, supra
note 2, at 7-11.
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prospect that gain-based damages might reduce the incidence of
contract breach and thus lead to a greater overall compliance with
corrective justice does not justify such damages from a corrective
justice perspective.
For an award of damages to conform to corrective justice, not
only must the breach of the contract be a wrong to the promisee but
the damages must be the measure of that wrong. Otherwise, there is
no reason for the damages to be awarded specifically to the promisee
for the injustice suffered. The Kantian account of contractual right,
which highlights the promisee's entitlement to the promisor's per-
formance, shows why a breach of contract can be viewed as a wrong
to the promisee within the framework of corrective justice. That
account, however, carries us no further than the promisee's entitle-
ment to compensation for the loss of the value of the performance.
Even though the gain realized by the promisor resulted from the
wrong to the promisee, it does not seem to be part of that wrong.
Accordingly, from the standpoint of corrective justice, it is not
enough for the proponent of disgorgement to dismiss the economic
theory of efficient breach as indifferent to the normative dimension of
contract law. If that normative dimension is to be fully respected, it is
also necessary to indicate the positive ground for thinking that the
gain is within the promisee's entitlement as quantifying the wrong
that the promisee has suffered. The fact that efficient breach is
incompatible with disgorgement does not entail the conclusion that
disgorgement follows from the rejection of efficient breach.
Neither the Israeli nor the English disgorgement cases succeed in
showing the promisee's particular entitlement to the gain that the
promisor is made to disgorge. In the Adras case Justice Barak
explicitly referred to the theory of efficient breach, rejecting it with
the following observations:
Moreover, it seems to me that the economic approach does not give
enough weight to considerations which cannot be measured in eco-
nomic terms. The law of contract is not only meant to increase
economic efficiency but also to enable society to lead a proper life.
Contracts are there to be performed, whether or not damages will
be payable on breach, an approach by which we encourage people
to keep their promises. Promise keeping is the basis of our life, as a
society and a nation.64
64. C.A. 20/82, Adras Bldg. Material v. Harlow & Jones 42(1) P.D. 221 (1988), translated in
3 RESTITUTION L. REV. 235, at 272 (1995). Similarly Justice S. Levin, id. at 241, acerbically
remarked that "the approach of the economic school of law ignores in cases like this the fact
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With these words Justice Barak rightly emphasized that contract has a
normative dimension that the economic approach ignores. However,
the vindication of the morality of promise-keeping against the amo-
rality of economically efficient breach is insufficient to ground a legal
entitlement in the promisee to the promisor's gains. What is needed
to sustain the decision is reference not to the social morality of
promising, but to contract as a juridical regime of rights and correla-
tive duties that renders the promisor's breach (and, in particular, the
realization of profit through breach) an injustice to the promisee.
Justice Barak's allusion to the role of promise-keeping in the proper
life of society makes it seem that the promisor's profiting from the
breach was not specifically a wrong against the promisee, but more
generally a subversion of the collective effort to preserve promise-
keeping as the basis on which social and national life rests. This view
of the profit, in turn, leaves unexplained why the promisee is entitled
to recover for what was a wrong against society as a whole.
Blake, the English case concerning the profits from the former
spy's memoirs, has a parallel difficulty. In ordering disgorgement,
Lord Nicholls, while acknowledging that disgorgement is an excep-
tional remedy not subject to fixed rules, offers as a general guide
"whether the plaintiff had a legitimate interest in preventing the
defendant's profit-making activity and, hence, in depriving him of his
profit."65 The legitimate interest included the need to preserve the
trust of informants and to uphold the morale of secret service officers,
apparently even with respect to information that was no longer
confidential.66 These considerations, however, do not address the
question of why the plaintiff was entitled to the profits, even assuming
the defendant was not. This absence of any entitlement to the gain on
the part of the plaintiff is perhaps why the dissenting judge, Lord
Hobhouse, pointing out that the defendant's gain was not made at the
plaintiff's expense, stigmatized the claim as being of an "essentially
punitive nature. '67
The reasoning of both Adras and Blake is instrumentalist. The
plaintiffs in these cases are awarded the profits realized from the
defendants' breaches of contract not because the plaintiffs can show
that we are dealing with people with moral feelings and not with robots." The Supreme Court
of Israel also referred to the significance of specific performance as the default remedy in Israeli
law for breach of contract; on this, see infra note 80.
65. Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [2000] 4 All E.R. 385, at 398 (H.L.).
66. Id. at 399.
67. ld. at 407.
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their respective entitlements to these profits, but because they are
conveniently situated for assisting in the accomplishment of certain
social goals. In Adras the goal is to encourage the socially important
practice of keeping promises. In Blake the goal is to forward the
effective functioning of the secret service. These considerations focus
on the desirability of preventing the defendants from keeping what
they might gain from breaching their contracts. The goals, as such,
are indifferent to the question of who might get the profits thus struck
from the defendants' hands. Instead of treating the gain as the locus
of an injustice done by the defendant and suffered by the plaintiff, the
reasoning points one-sidedly to the inadmissibility of the defendant's
profit. The position of the plaintiffs is adventitious; they are con-
nected to their respective defendants through their contractual
entitlements even though the profits that they are awarded are not
themselves constituents of those entitlements. In this respect the
reasoning in the cases is incompatible with the correlative structure of
corrective justice.68
So far as corrective justice is concerned, disgorgement is an ap-
propriate remedy when the defendant wrongfully alienates something
to which the plaintiff had a proprietary right.69 By virtue of ownership
the owner is entitled to all the profits that accrue from the alienation
of what is owned. Just as the owner's exclusive right to the object
implies a duty on others to abstain from it, so the owner's right to the
profits that accrue from its alienation imports a correlative duty in
others to abstain from such profits or, if there was a failure to abstain,
to yield these profits to the owner. The profits belong to the owner as
surely as the object that produced them. The correlativity of the
owner's right and the wrongdoer's duty means that the wrongful gain
is an injustice as between them. The injustice embodied in this gain is
undone when the gain is restored to the owner of the object from
which the gain accrued. The proprietary nature of what was alienated
68. Once the exercise is conceived instrumentally as the forwarding of extrinsic goals, the
choice of certain goals at the expense of others becomes significant. What, for instance, makes
the promotion of promissory good faith more important than the promotion of economic
efficiency (as the Supreme Court of Israel assumes)? Hanoch Dagan, for example, has
suggested that both are important and the profits should be split to reflect this. Dagan, supra
note 7, at 151. This natural consequence of instrumental analysis would produce the incoher-
ence of two considerations (efficiency and promissory good faith) each artificially limiting the
reach of the other. On the problematic normative structure of such incoherence, see WEINRIB,
supra note 5, at 32-44.
69. For a more extended treatment of this point, see Weinrib, supra note 2, at 12-18.
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makes the realization of profits a correlatively structured wrong that
accounts for the role of both parties in the remedy.
The paradigmatic example of this is the jurisprudence that origi-
nates in the old waiver of tort cases. 70 For centuries the common law
has held that if property is wrongfully misappropriated and sold
above market value, the owner need not restrict his or her recovery to
the value of the property but can successfully sue the wrongdoer for
the proceeds. In these instances, the measure of damages is gain-
based rather than loss-based. The justification for moving not only
the market value but the surplus above the market value from the
defendant to the plaintiff is not that the defendant should not profit
from a wrong; that principle would only explain why the defendant
should not keep that surplus, but not why the plaintiff should receive
it. The crucial point is that the owner's proprietary right carries with
it an entitlement to the proceeds from the sale, whatever they are.
Because the wrongful realization of the surplus was an injustice
between the parties, the gain-based damage award simply requires
the defendant to restore what rightfully belongs to the plaintiff. The
proprietary nature of the plaintiff's right accounts for the presence of
both parties at the remedial stage, thereby rendering the defendant-
oriented principle against profiting from one's wrong superfluous in
these circumstances.
This indicates that in the contracts context the promisee should
be awarded the promisor's profits only if the breach of contract can
be construed as the alienation of what belongs to the promisee. Then,
under the principle evidenced in the waiver of tort cases and sup-
ported by corrective justice, the profits from the breach would
rightfully belong to the promisee.
The Kantian account of contractual entitlement set out in Part I
reveals the implausibility of regarding the breach as the wrongful
alienation of the promisee's property. The difficulty is to identify the
property alienated through breach. There are only two possibilities.
However, in the first of these there is no property; in the second there
may be property in some sense, but there is no alienation.
The first possibility is that the promisee owns the object prom-
ised in the contract. However, in the Kantian view the promisee is
entitled to performance but does not have property in the object of
70. See generally supra note 56. I have presented a corrective justice analysis of the issues
these cases raise in Weinrib, supra note 2.
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the contract. In the Adras case, for instance, the contract to ship a
certain quantity of steel to the promisee did not in itself transform
any of the defendant's steel into the property of the plaintiff. The
plaintiff, therefore, should have had no claim to the profits made by
the sale to the third party, even if the steel would otherwise have been
shipped in fulfillment of the contract. To the contrary: the defendant
was simply selling its own steel and was accordingly entitled to the
profits from the sale by virtue of its ownership of what it sold.
The other possibility concerns the contractual performance itself,
which, in the Kantian account, constitutes the promisee's contractual
entitlement and the promisor's correlative obligation. To be sure, the
entitlement to contractual performance can be treated as a species of
property for certain purposes (for example, classification as a chose in
action, assignment, constitutional protection).7 However, the promi-
sor's breach cannot plausibly be regarded as a purported alienation of
this entitlement, so as to give the promisee a claim to the profits in
the promisor's hand. The Adras case is illustrative. The promisor's
obligation was to perform a certain act, that is, to deliver steel to the
promisee. The breach consisted in not delivering the steel, which had
been sold to a third party. This breach can hardly be construed as the
promisor's alienation of something that can be conceptualized as "the
delivery of steel as owed to the promisee." What it sold to the third
party was the steel that would have fulfilled its contract with the
promisee; it did not sell the act of delivery that was owed by the
promisor to the promisee. Nor did it alienate the promisee's entitle-
ment. The third party contracted with respect to the steel, not with
respect to the promisee's entitlement. Moreover, although the steel
could not be delivered to the promisee because the promisor no
longer had it, the promisee remained as entitled to the delivery as
before. Nor, finally, did the promisor alienate the obligation correla-
tive to the promisee's entitlement; by buying the steel, the third party
did not become obligated, as the promisor was and remained, to
deliver steel to the promisee.
71. For example, in a discussion of contract damages Daniel Friedmann suggests that,
because contractual rights enjoy the constitutional protection of property for purposes of the
takings clause of the constitution of the United States, property includes contractual rights.
Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 16 (1989). However, it
would be a non sequitur to argue that because the state compensates for the taking of contrac-
tual rights, the promisor should be liable to noncompensatory damages for breaching a contract.
The compensatory norms of constitutional law are irrelevant to the private law's treatment of
noncompensatory awards. Reference to a contract as property for constitutional purposes in no
way bridges the gap in this argument.
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Thus, a breach of contract is not tantamount to the alienation of
a proprietary right. Because a proprietary right imposes a duty of
noninterference on the whole world, it has a juridical significance that
is independent of any particular wrongdoer. This independence
means that the obligation has to be defined in terms of a particular
object that is separate from the indefinite number of juridical rela-
tionships in which it figures. That object is therefore available for
misappropriation in a transaction between one nonproprietor and
another, with consequent liability to the owner for the proceeds of
this transaction. The waiver of tort jurisprudence, where the defen-
dant makes an unauthorized disposition of the plaintiff's property,
illustrates such liability. Breaches of contract are different. The
nature of the required performance is defined by the contract be-
tween the parties and has no juridical existence independent of their
relationship. The contract imposes an obligation to perform, that is,
to do or abstain from doing a particular act, which is personal to the
promisor. Although the promisor can act inconsistently with the
contractual obligation and breach it, the breach is not an alienation.
The relationship of entitlement and obligation as between the parties
remains intact. The subject matter of the promisee's entitlement-
which is always the promisor's act (the delivery of steel in Adras) and
not the thing required for the act (the steel itself)-has not been and
cannot be passed on to a third party by the promisor's breach.
Accordingly, the profits that the promisor has realized from the
breach do not fall within the entitlement of the promisee.
In the Blake case, the significance of the difference between con-
tractual and proprietary entitlement was a matter of dispute between
the judges. Lord Hobhouse, dissenting, was in favor of dismissing the
claim for the disgorgement of profits on the ground that "[t]hat is a
remedy based on proprietary principles when the necessary proprie-
tary rights are absent."" Lord Nicholls, on the other hand, remarked
in allowing the claim that "it is not easy to see why, as between the
parties to a contract, a violation of a party's contractual rights should
attract a lesser degree of remedy than a violation of his property
rights. 73 Lord Nicholls' assumption was that the only difference
between a contractual and a proprietary right is a quantitative one-
that the former obligates only one person whereas the latter obligates
72. Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [2000] 4 All E.R. 385, at 410 (H.L.).
73. Id. at 395.
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an indefinite number of persons.74 Lord Nicholls therefore concluded
that "it is not clear why it should be any more permissible to expro-
priate personal rights than it is permissible to expropriate property
rights." 75
Lord Nicholls' conclusion is suspect for a number of reasons.
First, given that breach of contract is the violation of a right, the issue
is not one of the relative permissibility of the defendant's conduct, but
of the remedial response appropriate to that conduct. Second, a
breach of contract is not helpfully characterized as an expropriation;
breach does not involve the taking of an object that can exist inde-
pendently of the relationship between the parties or the extinction of
an entitlement owing to the plaintiff. Moreover, Lord Nicholls'
conclusion proves too much: if there were no difference between
proprietary and contractual entitlement, disgorgement would be the
standard remedy when the promisor profitably breaches, rather than
the extraordinary one that even Lord Nicholls treats it as. Most
importantly, the difference between proprietary and contractual
entitlement is not merely quantitative. In Adras, for instance, the
promisee did not have a contractual right that consisted in owning the
steel with only the promisor being subject to a correlative obligation,
in contrast to a proprietary interest in the steel that created a correla-
tive obligation for the whole world. The promisee in Adras did not
own the steel at all; all that the promisee was entitled to was a certain
performance. The difference between a proprietary and a contractual
right is qualitative; the former goes to an object, the latter to an
action.76 The result of this is that nothing is available for the promisor
to expropriate or alienate, since these verbs are inapplicable as
descriptions of what the promisor does with respect to an entitlement
that consists of his own actions. Consequently, as Lord Hobhouse
saw in dissent, disgorgement is an inappropriate remedy for contract
breach. 77
Is this conclusion affected by whether the remedy to which the
promisee is entitled is specific performance? For instance, in con-
74. This assumption is developed in the article on which Lord Nicholls expressly draws.
See Smith, supra note 51, at 130-32.
75. Blake, [2000] 4 All E.R. 385, at 395.
76. In Kant's terminology, proprietary and contractual obligations deal with objects of
choice that come within different categories of the understanding: property deals with substance
(an external thing) and contract deals with causality (another's choice to perform a specific
deed). KANT, supra note 30, at 402 [6:247].
77. Blake, [2000] 4 All E.R. 385, at 410.
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tracts for the sale of land, where the purchaser is entitled to specific
performance, courts may describe the vendor as a trustee and the
purchaser as the equitable owner, and hold the vendor liable for the
profits realized from reselling the land to the third party at higher
price. 8 One may be tempted to regard such instances as evidence
that, even though disgorgement is not generally a remedy for contract
breach, the availability of specific performance transforms the pro-
misee's contractual entitlement into a proprietary one so as to allow
the promisee to claim the promisor's profits from sale. In this way of
considering the promisee's entitlement, the supposed transformation
of the contractual entitlement into a proprietary one is merely a
terminological shorthand for anticipating the availability of specific
performance;7 9 the conclusion about the property is the result of the
premise about the remedy.
This approach to the entitlement is inconsistent with corrective
justice's conception of the relation of right and remedy. For correc-
tive justice the right is conceptually prior to the remedy that responds
to the right's infringement. Of course, if the system of private law is
well-ordered, the remedy will reflect the kind of entitlement that the
plaintiff has. The remedy, however, does not determine the nature of
the underlying right. Whether the entitlement is proprietary or not
depends on the concepts internal to the juridical relationship between
the parties (such as the connection between the alienation of property
and the claim to proceeds). It does not depend on the court's re-
sponse to the defendant's injustice. The remedy, therefore, cannot
transform into a proprietary right that which is not already one before
the remedy is fixed 0
78. Timko v. Useful Homes Corp., 168 A. 824 (N.J. Ch. 1933); Lake v. Bayliss, [1974] 1
W.L.R. 1073 (Ch.).
79. Dawson, supra note 53, at 186.
80. At common law, specific performance is available where damages are inadequate due
to the real or (as in the case of land in traditional contract doctrine) deemed uniqueness of the
subject matter of the contract. The consequence of this uniqueness is that the market cannot
reliably determine the value of what the promisee has lost through the breach. Only by granting
specific performance or by treating the promisee as equitable owner and therefore entitled to
the proceeds can the law ensure that promisor is awarded what he or she has been unjustly
deprived of. Accordingly, cases such as those mentioned above in note 78 need not be
considered as examples of disgorgement rather than compensation.
Even the fact that in a given jurisdiction (for example, in Israel) specific performance is
the default remedy should not affect the argument about disgorgement. In the Adras case, the
Supreme Court of Israel thought that the institution of specific performance as the default
remedy for contract breach in Israel marks a fundamental difference from the common law that
makes disgorgement more plausible. C.A. 20/82, Adras Bldg. Material v. Harlow & Jones 42(1)
P.D. 221 (1988), translated in 3 RESTITUTION L. REV. 235, at 241, 271 (1995). This, however, is
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Thus, the general picture that emerges from the present discus-
sion is as follows. Making the promisee disgorge his or her gains to
prevent profiting from a wrong has intuitive appeal. Corrective
justice, however, requires that the parties be treated as correlatively
situated through the right of the plaintiff and the corresponding duty
of the defendant. One-sided attention to the defendant's gains does
not reflect this correlativity. If disgorgement for contract breach is to
conform to corrective justice, the promisor's profit must be under-
stood as proceeds from the alienation of the promisee's property.
Given the Kantian account of contractual entitlement, an alienation
of property cannot be made out. Disgorgement of the gains from
contract breach awards the promisee something that the promisee
was not deprived of.
To a large extent this conclusion coincides with the result favored
by the theory of efficient breach. However, this convergence in result
masks a fundamental divide between the two approaches. As its
critics have emphasized,8 efficient breach abstracts from the norma-
tive dimension of contract to the promotion of efficiency. In contrast,
corrective justice, by exhibiting the immanently normative structure
of the contract relationship as a nexus of rights and correlative duties,
is normative through and through. Instead of disavowing (as the
economic approach does) an interest in contractual performance as a
duty, corrective justice maintains that the nature of that duty excludes
the notion of disgorgement. Thus, its rejection of the disgorgement of
gains from contract breach comes not in the pursuit of an external
not necessarily the case. All that the status of specific performance as the primary remedy
indicates is that the Israeli system takes very seriously the idea that the promisee is, as
corrective justice affirms, entitled to performance; it does not necessarily change the subject
matter of the performance into a proprietary right. The temptation to slide from the former to
the latter should be resisted. For example, Justice Barak writes:
The injured party has a right not only to compensation for breach of contract, but also
to specific performance.... Therefore, under Israeli law, a buyer in a contract of sale
is entitled to receive the subject-matter of the sale, and an enrichment of the seller
which infringes this right is an unjust enrichment at the buyer's expense... . When
there is a contract for the sale of a horse, the buyer has the right to receive the horse,
not damages for non-delivery. If the seller receives a benefit from selling the horse to
a third party, he ... takes from the buyer a right to which the buyer is entitled.
Id. at 271. There is an equivocation here about the right to which the last sentence refers. A
right to receive the horse is not the same as a right to the horse (to which the language of
"taking" might be applicable). The former right is to the performance of an act, the latter is to a
particular thing. The former is contractual, the latter proprietary. The enhanced role of specific
performance does not change the categorical difference between what KANT, supra note 30,
called substance and causality.
81. See especially Friedmann, supra note 71.
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goal like economic efficiency, but as an internal implication of the
very idea of contractual entitlement
V. PUNISHMENT AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
I now move to the possibility of punitive damages for breach of
contract. This possibility has lurked in the background of the preced-
ing discussion of expectation damages and disgorgement. Once one
assumes that a given head of damages is not compensatory, one is
tempted to ascribe to it a punitive purpose. Thus, Lord Hobhouse,
dissenting in Blake, maintained that a claim for disgorgement had an
"essentially punitive nature. 82 Similarly, Fuller and Perdue at one
point suggested that, in the absence of a plausible compensatory
justification for them, expectation damages might be viewed as having
the implicit purpose of penalizing the promisor's breach for the sake
of protecting the reliance interest. 83 Such observations about implicit
purpose raise the question of whether an explicitly punitive compo-
nent should be added to the damage award. The two sections that
follow address this question by considering from the standpoint of
corrective justice first, the theoretical relationship between punish-
ment and liability and then, the use of punitive damages specifically
for contract breach.
At the juncture of punishment and liability lies the issue of puni-
tive damages. Such damages are encased in controversy. Formally
unrecognized in the civil law jurisdictions but widely accepted in the
common law world, punitive damages have been especially conten-
tious over the last several decades. Developments in both the United
States and England have contributed to this. In the United States, the
relatively unstructured discretion of the jury to determine damages
has led to concerns that the standards for awarding punitive damages
are too vague and that the awards themselves may be excessive. 84 In
England a more fundamental development occurred: the House of
Lords, unequivocally repudiating punitive damages as anomalous,
restricted their scope to the minimum allowed by precedent, a posi-
tion in turn rejected by courts in the old Commonwealth. 85
82. Blake, 4 All E.R. 385, at 407.
83. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 3, at 61.
84. David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 705,
727-38 (1989).
85. The House of Lords cases are Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] 1 All E.R. 367 (H.L.), and
Cassel & Co. Ltd.l v. Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027 (H.L.). The leading cases in the Commonwealth
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The House of Lords was of the view that almost the only circum-
stance when punitive damages were available at common law in a
dispute between private parties was when the wrongdoer's conduct
was calculated to make a profit that would exceed the compensation
payable to the victim.86 Lord Reid termed the traditional broader
conception of punitive damages a "form of palm tree justice" and he
characterized the objections to it as "overwhelming. ' 87 He explained:
To allow pure punishment in this way contravenes almost every
principle which has been evolved for the protection of offenders.
There is no definition of the offence except that the conduct pun-
ished must be oppressive, high-handed, malicious, wanton, or its
like-terms far too vague to be admitted to any criminal code wor-
thy of the name. There is no limit to punishment except that it
must not be unreasonable. The punishment is not inflicted by a
judge who has experience and at least tries not to be influenced by
emotion: it is inflicted by a jury without experience of law or pun-
ishment and often swayed by considerations which every judge
would put out of his mind. And there is no effective appeal against
sentence.88
Critics of the English approach have responded that the institutional
distinction between criminal law and private law does not dictate so
exclusive an allocation of punishment to the criminal law. 89
This controversy raises two fundamental issues. The narrower
issue concerns the role of punishment, as expressed through an award
of punitive damages, within private law. In dealing with this issue,
reaction are Uren v. Fairfax & Sons Pty, Ltd., (1966) 117 C.L.R. 118 (Aust.); Fogg v. McKnight,
[1968] N.Z.L.R. 330 (N.Z.); Lamb v. Cotogno, (1987) 164 CLR 1; Vorvis v. Ins. Corp. of B.C.,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085; and Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] D.L.R. (4th) 257 (S.C.C.). See also A v.
Bottrill, 2002 U.K.P.C. 44, Tr., (September 6, 2002) (Privy Council on appeal from New
Zealand).
86. Rookes, [1964] 1 All E.R. at 410. The House of Lords also allowed punitive damages
where they are authorized by statute and where there was oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitu-
tional action by government employees. These categories are not relevant to the present theme.
On the second of these, see Kuddus v. Chief Constable of the Leicestershire Constabulary, [2001]
2 W.L.R. 1789 (H.L.).
87. Cassell, [1972] A.C. at 1087.
88. Id.
89. PETER CANE, THE ANATOMY OF TORT LAW 118 (1997); Nicholas McBride, Punitive
Damages, in WRONGS AND REMEDIES IN THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 175 (Peter Birks ed.,
1996). For an assessment of the controversy, see Andrew Burrows, Reforming Exemplary
Damages: Expansion or Abolition?, in WRONGS AND REMEDIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 153 (Peter Birks ed., 1996). In England the Law Commission under Burrows'
direction has recommended the expansion of punitive damages. See AGGRAVATED,
EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES, Law Comm. No. 427 (1997). Also favoring
punitive damages is EDELMAN, supra note 51, at 9-21. The arguments against punitive damages
have now been restated by Allan Beever, The Structure ofAggravated and Exemplary Damages,
23 OXFORD J. LEG. ST. 87 (2003).
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Lord Reid adverted to the significance of the procedural distinctions
between tort law and criminal law.90 This in turn implicates the
second and broader issue of determining the nature of the demarca-
tion between civil and criminal liability. How does corrective justice
stand with respect to these two issues?
The first of these two issues can be briefly treated. That correc-
tive justice renders punitive damages problematic is obvious on its
face. Corrective justice insists that the normative considerations
applicable to the relationship between plaintiff and defendant reflect
the parties' correlative standing as the doer and sufferer of the same
injustice.91 Accordingly, it excludes considerations, regardless of how
appealing they otherwise might be, that refer to one of the parties
without encompassing the correlative situation of the other. Punish-
ment is a one-sided consideration of this sort. Punishment focuses
not relationally on the parties as doer and sufferer of the same
injustice, but unilaterally on the defendant as doer. From a punitive
standpoint, we do not ask what would restore to the plaintiff what he
or she was deprived of by the defendant, but rather what punishment
is deserved in view of the defendant's behavior. Accordingly, dam-
ages that are the vehicle of punishment are a windfall to the plaintiff
because they do not represent anything that the plaintiff has been
wrongfully deprived of. Instead of measuring the plaintiff's entitle-
ment, punitive damages, in effect, function as a reward for providing
the socially useful service of acting as a private prosecutor. 9
The second and broader issue of the difference between civil and
criminal liability requires more extensive consideration. Although
corrective justice is a regime of rights and their correlative duties, the
denial of the relevance of punishment to corrective justice is not a
denial of punishment's place in a right-based legal order. Instead, the
point is that from the standpoint of corrective justice, this place must
be located within criminal rather than private law. Since corrective
justice brings out the distinctiveness of the private law relationship, it
illuminates Lord Reid's differentiation between criminal and civil
liability and his insistence that punishment is the concern of the
former and not the latter. From the standpoint of corrective justice,
the relationship between compensation and punishment, and between
90. Cassell, [1972] A.C. at 1087.
91. See discussion, supra Part I.
92. Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., (2002) 209 D.L.R. (4th) 257, at para. 36 (S.C.C.).
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the legal institutions of private law and criminal law, that correspond
to them is, I suggest, as follows. 93
Corrective justice rectifies injustices that operate on the parties
in a transactionally specific way. This transactional specificity in-
volves linking two specific parties through the infringement by one of
them of a particular right held by the other. For example, the defen-
dant may have tortiously injured the plaintiff as a result of acting
inconsistently with the plaintiff's right to his or her own physical
integrity or to a specific item of property that the plaintiff owns. Or
the defendant may have breached a specific person's right to some
particular performance under a valid contract. Or the defendant may
have been unjustly enriched by gaining something of value that
rightfully belongs to the plaintiff. Such injustices relate to particular
rights that a specific plaintiff is entitled to vindicate against a specific
defendant as a matter of corrective justice.
Additionally, however, an aspect of wrong may consist in what
the defendant's action signifies, not only about a particular right
belonging to some other specific person, but also about the regime of
rights as such. When this aspect of wrong is present, the deliberate-
ness of the actor's violation of the victim's right shows that implicit in
that violation is the actor's rejection-at least so far as that particular
action is concerned-of the very idea that rights govern the interac-
tion of the parties. 94  Because of this deliberateness, the actor's
behaviour is often described by the vituperative adjectives (instanced
by Lord Reid's reference to conduct that is "oppressive, high-handed,
malicious, wanton or its like" 95) that figure in accounts of punitive
damages. This element of the wrong has a transactionally nonspecific
aspect because its concern is with the wrongdoer's relationship not
93. What follows draws on Hegel's treatment of wrong. HEGEL, supra note 28, §§ 82-103.
Perspicuous presentations can be found in Peter P. Nicholson, Hegel on Crime, 3 HIST. POL.
THOUGHT 102 (1982), and ALAN BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW: STUDIES IN
HEGELIAN JURISPRUDENCE 229-35 (1995). For an application of Hegel's treatment of wrong
to punitive damages, see Bruce Chapman & Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence
in Search of a Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REV. 741, 779-86 (1989). I should acknowledge that,
although I am drawing on Hegel's account of the distinction between civil and criminal liability,
I am not adopting Hegel's view of contract liability itself. For differing Hegelian accounts of
contractual obligation, see BRUDNER, supra at 87-152, and Benson, The Unity of Contract Law,
supra note 3. For other views on the crime/tort distinction, see the Symposium, The Intersec-
tion of Tort & Criminal Law 76 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1996).
94. But see A. v. Bottrill, 2002 U.K.P.C. 44, Tr., (September 6, 2002) (a 3-2 decision of the
Privy Council on appeal from New Zealand, holding that awards of punitive damages are not
restricted to cases of intentional or consciously reckless wrongdoing).
95. Cassell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027, 1087 (H.L.).
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merely to the particular right of a specific victim but also to the
regime of rights more generally. Thus, although wrongful conduct of
this sort may cause a transactionally specific injury that falls under
corrective justice, its challenge to the regime of rights is, in addition,
wrongful in a transactionally nonspecific way. Punishment is the legal
order's response to this challenge.
This transactionally nonspecific aspect of wrong may take two
forms. In the first of these the wrongdoer implicitly treats the regime
of rights as a nullity, and in the second as a pretense.
The wrongdoer treats the regime of rights as a nullity by exercis-
ing willful coercion that violates another's right in property or physi-
cal integrity. The willfulness of the coercive wrong indicates that
implicit in the wrongdoer's conduct is a subjective principle of action
that purports to make the other, or what belongs to the other, avail-
able to the wrongdoer's use. The wrongdoing amounts to the asser-
tion of dominion over the victim's person or property. The
wrongdoer thus deals with the victim not as a locus of self-
determining freedom, but as a thing whose person or property the
wrongdoer can treat as his or her own. Moreover, because the
wrongdoer shares with the whole world the obligation not to violate
the victim's right to property or physical integrity, deliberate disre-
gard of that obligation signals the intentional removal of oneself from
the community of participants in the regime of right and correlative
duty. In effect, the wrongdoer can be regarded as proceeding on the
basis that the victim's rights (and the correlative duties that they
impose) do not matter. In this sense, the wrongdoer treats the regime
of rights as nonexistent.
The idea that deliberate wrongdoing nullifies the regime of right
applies to violations of physical integrity and property, but not to
breaches of contract even if such breaches are (as in fact is usually the
case) themselves deliberate. This is because the considerations that
justify construing deliberate violations of person and property as
nullifying the regime of right are absent for breaches of contract. The
breaching promisor does not coerce the promisee simply by virtue of
the breach.9 6 Because the promisee's right is to the causality of the
96. It would be coercive if a threatened breach were accompanied by a demand. On the
issues that the combination of threatened breach and demand raise, see Rick Bigwood,
Coercion in Contract: The Theoretical Constructs of Duress, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 201, 238-51
(1996), and Hamish Stewart, A Formal Approach to Contractual Duress, 47 U. TORONTO L.J.
175 (1997).
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promisor's will, the promisor who fails to carry out the obligated
performance is acting with reference to his or her own will, not the
promisee's. Here violation of the right is not an assertion of domin-
ion over the promisee's person or property (recall that property in
what was promised is precisely what contract does not transfer) but
merely a defection by the promisor from the shared purpose that
marked the contract's formation. Moreover, the breach cannot be
construed as removing oneself from the community of those under a
duty shared by the whole world. No such community exists, because
the contractual obligation is personal to the promisor, reflecting as it
does the promisor's voluntary assumption of this duty when the
contract was formed. None of this denies, of course, that by breach-
ing the contract the promisor has violated a right belonging to the
promisee. The point rather is that a contract does not create the kind
of right whose deliberate breach can be construed as nullifying the
regime of rights. 7 In other words, even deliberate breaches of
contract are always transactionally specific and therefore in them-
selves leave no punishable residue. This is reflected in the fact that,
unlike intentional violations of physical integrity or appropriations of
another's property, breaches of contract are not treated as crimes in
any sophisticated legal system.
There is, however, a second form of transactionally nonspecific
wrong where contract plays an essential role. This second form
features the perpetration of a fraud. In the typical fraud, the perpe-
trator deliberately induces a false belief about what the perpetrator
owns or about the value of what the perpetrator is selling and then
inveigles the victim into contracting on the basis of that false belief.
Here the wrongdoer implicitly treats the regime of rights not as
nonexistent but as a pretense to be exploited in harming others.
Unlike coercive wrongdoers, perpetrators of fraud do not treat their
victims as things without rights; on the contrary, the fraud always
depends on the victim's consent to the transaction. However, the
respect for the victim exhibited by securing this consent turns out to
be a charade, because the misinformation was deliberately put out by
the perpetrator for the purpose of precluding the consent from being
a genuine manifestation of the victim's self-determining agency.
97. For an argument that punishment should attach to deliberate breaches of contract in
the same way that they should attach to deliberate breaches of other common law obligations,
see Nicholas J. McBride, A Case for Awarding Punitive Damages in Response to Deliberate
Breaches of Contract, 24 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 369 (1995), and McBride, supra note 89, at 191-
92. For an economic argument to the same conclusion, see Dodge, supra note 7.
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Similarly, perpetrators of fraud, far from implicitly nullifying the
regime of rights, require its existence, because that regime provides
the mechanism of their fraudulent conduct. If I propose to sell you
the Brooklyn Bridge, I require that there be a law of contract to
provide a purportedly effective legal facility for executing this fraudu-
lent transaction and a law of property to create the impression that I
own the bridge now and that when I sell it the bridge will belong to
you. In contrast, if I coercively take the Brooklyn Bridge from its
present owner, I treat as a nullity the law recognizing proprietary
rights and requiring that property transfers be consensual. Fraud thus
differs from coercion in presupposing the validity rather than the
nullity of the regime of rights. In fraud, however, this respect for the
regime of right is also a pretense; the regime of right is being used
abusively, not to secure the rights of the victim but to facilitate their
violation.
In this context the significance of deliberateness, which is essen-
tial both for coercive and for fraudulent wrongdoing, is juridical, not
ethical. The deliberateness of the wrong is relevant not because it
permits the drawing of an inference about the wrongdoer's character
so that the penalty can be commensurate with the wrongdoer's
wickedness. 98 Rather, willfulness goes to the meaning, from the
standpoint of the system of rights, of the wrongdoer's act in relation
to another. The wrongdoer did more than intentionally inflict a
wrongful injury on the victim, which could be rectified by holding the
wrongdoer civilly liable to repair the victim's harm. By deliberately
coercing or defrauding the victim in violation of his or her rights, the
wrongdoer also treated the regime of rights as a nullity or as a pre-
tense.
Thus the element of deliberateness in coercion and fraud plays a
double role. On the one hand, the presence of deliberateness means
that the defendant acts intentionally in the execution of a purpose
that consists of injuring the plaintiff. Intent thereby constitutes the
element of culpability linking the defendant's wrongful action to the
plaintiff's wrongful injury. This role is transactionally specific and
therefore within the scope of corrective justice. On the other hand,
the deliberateness of the wrongful conduct also goes to nullification
or abusiveness with respect to the regime of rights more generally.
98. For the contrary argument, that punishment involves an inference from the wrongful
act to the actor's character, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 800
(1978).
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This role is not transactionally specific, because, although the injus-
tice takes place within a transactional context in which a specific
person may be 99 injured, the deliberateness has significance that goes
beyond that injury to what the conduct implies about the entire
regime of rights. Because of this double role deliberateness can
figure both as the mental element of an intentional tort and as the
mens rea of a criminal act.
Only inasmuch as the deliberateness yields something transac-
tionally specific does it become relevant to corrective justice. One
instance of this is aggravated damages. These may be awarded when
the injury done to the plaintiff is aggravated by malevolence that
injures the plaintiff's proper feelings of dignity and self-worth.1 °
These damages are simply the consequence of the transactionally
specific role that intent may play in linking what the plaintiff suffered
to what the defendant did. Aggravated damages are the law's ac-
knowledgement of what Aquinas observed long ago, that "the injury
of the deliberate transgressor is greater, for internal contempt is
added to external damage." 10 1  The courts properly regard such
damages as compensatory rather than punitive, since they repair a
loss, albeit an intangible one."0 2
A second instance is willfulness by the defendant that leads to a
gain through the usurpation and commodification of a proprietary or
quasi-proprietary right belonging to the plaintiff. When the defen-
dant, acting with knowledge of the plaintiff's right, has realized a
profit by appropriating and selling it, this profit must be restored.
Only the owner can rightfully realize a profit from the sale of what is
owned. The transactional nexus is established through the defen-
dant's profiteering from the plaintiff's right; the gain that results is
then transactionally specific to the parties. The surviving category of
punitive damages in England for conduct calculated to make a profit
is a variant of this idea.1 3 From the standpoint of corrective justice,
this kind of award is not, properly speaking, punitive at all. Rather,
99. I say "may be" rather than "is" because the challenge to the regime of rights does not
necessarily require that someone actually be injured. This, I would suggest, is why there are
attempted crimes but not attempted torts.
100. Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] 1 All E.R. 367, 412 (H.L.).
101. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, v. 1, 420 (C.
Litzinger trans., 1964).
102. S. M. WADDAMS, THE LAW OF DAMAGES 483 (3d ed. 1997).
103. Rookes, [1964] 1 All E.R. at 410.
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the gain represents the transactionally specific element on which
corrective justice can bite.t°4
Apart from such transactionally specific consequences of delib-
erateness, punishment is the response by which the law coercively
brings home to the wrongdoer the illegitimacy of the wrongdoer's
deliberate wrongdoing. Through punishment for coercive wrong the
law demonstrates that the wrongdoer's coercive will does not have
the supremacy that the wrongdoer's conduct implicitly claims for it.
Similarly, through punishment for fraud the law negates the notion
that the regime of rights is a mere pretense that proclaims norms of
justice while facilitating wrongdoing. By punishing for coercion and
fraud, the law asserts that the regime of rights is not merely a specula-
tive ideal but an effective institutional reality that can demand and
enforce adherence to its norms.105
The fact that punishment is a response to the deliberate wrong-
doer's implicit challenge to the regime of rights determines the form
that this response takes. The general nature of the wrong requires a
correspondingly general response. Because the wrong was an implicit
nullification or abuse of the regime of rights, its vindication lies at the
hand not of a particular rights holder (as would be the case with
corrective justice), but of a representative of the nullified or abused
regime of rights. Hence, the state, "the whole of individuals in a
rightful condition in relation to its own members,"1 6 acting through
its public prosecutors, has the role of initiating and carrying the legal
process that determines the guilt and consequent punishment of the
accused wrongdoer. Moreover, because this process concerns delib-
erate wrongs, the intention with which the act was performed is
crucial to assessment of the actor's guilt. The definition of the
offence must therefore reflect the reason for the state's interest in the
actor's behavior. This accounts for the salience of mens rea in the
criminal law.
These observations on the twofold role of deliberateness provide
the conceptual ground for regarding civil liability and punishment as
distinct. This distinctiveness works in both directions. On the one
hand, the punitive arrangements of criminal law are not rendered
superfluous by the existence of a system of civil liability; that system
deals merely with transactionally specific violations of rights rather
104. For a more extended discussion, see Weinrib, supra note 2, at 32-36.
105. ROBERT R. WILLIAMS, HEGEL'S ETHICS OF RECOGNITION 173-76 (1997).
106. KANT, supra note 30, at 455 [6:311].
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than with transactionally nonspecific challenges to the regime of
rights more generally. On the other hand, punishment cannot coher-
ently be stuffed into the framework of civil liability, for then lawsuits
that have a transactionally specific structure, in which a specific
plaintiff sues a specific defendant to achieve reparation for the
violation of a particular right, would have to deal with transactionally
nonspecific wrongs. The result of this would be awards of punitive
damages, which inevitably give a windfall to the plaintiff on the basis
of considerations that go one-sidedly to the deliberateness of the
defendant's conduct.
Lord Reid's repudiation of punitive damages, quoted above,107
picks up the institutional implications of this incoherence. Because a
deliberate challenge to the regime of rights is more serious than the
infringement of a particular right, and because conviction carries the
stigma of criminality, criminal law insists on the express definition of
offences and of possible punishments. Criminal law also entrenches
procedural safeguards (such as the benefit of a more stringent burden
of proof) for those who are accused, which would be out of place in a
civil trial because the advantage they would give to defendants would
be incompatible with the notional equality of the parties as the
alleged doer and sufferer of the same injustice. Lord Reid's criticism
of punitive damages as involving a form of palm tree justice, as well as
the almost complete English rejection of punitive damages, thus gives
legal expression to the conceptual difference between corrective
justice and punishment and to the institutional roles that each has
within a rights-based approach to law.
VI. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN CONTRACT
With these general considerations about punitive damages in
hand, I want to turn more specifically to punitive damages in contract
law. In contrast to the situation in tort law, where such damages have
historically been well entrenched and the controversy has been
whether the legal order ought to restrict them, contract law was
traditionally hostile toward punitive damages. One can ascribe this
hostility to the fear of disturbing the certainty of commercial dealings
by introducing a damage component that floated free of the value of
the contractual performance to which the parties had agreed. In
England this hostility remains. In the United States, however, the
107. Cassell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027, 1087 (H.L.).
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rule against awarding punitive damages for breach of contract has
been eroding for the past century. Beginning with an exception that
punitive damages could be allowed when the breach was accompa-
nied by a fraudulent act, 108 the present majority position in the United
States is that punitive damages can be awarded if the conduct consti-
tuting the breach of contract is also a tort for which punitive damages
can be given, with some state courts allowing such damages on even
more expansive grounds. 109
Perhaps the most dramatic recent developments have occurred in
Canada. In 1989 the Supreme Court of Canada, signaling its rejection
of the restrictive English approach to punitive damages, recognized
that punitive damages were available (though it did not in fact award
them) for breach of contract."0 There matters stood until 2002, when
in Whiten v Pilot Insurance the Court upheld a punitive damage
award against an insurer who attempted to evade honoring a fire
insurance policy. "I The plaintiff in Whiten had insured her house
with the defendant. When her house burned down, the defendants
denied her claim under the policy, alleging without basis that the
plaintiff had committed arson. For two years the defendant persisted
in hostile and groundless opposition to the claim. In the meantime,
because the insurance claim was substantially her sole asset, the
plaintiff's financial situation deteriorated. The defendant's conduct
was deliberately designed (so it was found) to starve the plaintiff into
an unfair settlement. The Court upheld a jury award that gave the
plaintiff not only the insurance proceeds to which she was entitled
under the policy, but an additional million dollars as punitive dam-
ages.
In coming to this conclusion the Court dealt comprehensively
with the issue of punitive damages. The Court emphasized that both
the decision to award punitive damages and the determination of the
quantum had to be rational in the light of the objectives of punitive
damages. The amount awarded also had to be proportionate to the
108. Welborn v. Dixon, 49 S.E. 232, 234 (S.C. 1904); see Laurence P. Simpson, Punitive
Damages for Breach of Contract, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 284 (1959).
109. Dodge, supra note 7, at 636-51. The majority United States position is of limited
interest in a discussion of contract damages, because it merely prevents the fact that there was a
breach of contract from precluding the concurrent tort remedies.
110. Vorvis v. Ins. Corp. of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C..R. 1085.
111. Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., (2002) 209 D.L.R. (4th) 257 (S.C.C.). At the same time the
Court issued a companion judgment applying Whiten and concluding that, under these
circumstances, an award of punitive damages for contract breach was not justified. Performance
Indus. Ltd. v. Sylvan Lake Golf & Tennis Club Ltd., (2002) 209 D.L.R. (4th) 318 (S.C.C.).
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accomplishment of those objectives. While punitive damages were
the exception rather than the rule, they nonetheless could be em-
ployed when compensatory damages and the law's other sanctions
were inadequate to achieve the retribution that the de fendant
deserved, the deterrence that would prevent similar conduct in the
future, and the denunciation that would mark the community's
collective condemnation. Retribution, deterrence, and denunciation
are the objectives of punitive damages; so long as an award was not so
disproportionate as to exceed the bounds of what is rational for the
achievement of these objectives, the award could stand.112
As a result of this development, the Canadian jurisprudence now
provides one of the most extensive recent discussions in the common
law world of punitive damages in contract law. Like many Common-
wealth jurisdictions, Canada has definitively repudiated the idea
(which corrective justice supports) that punitive damages have no
place in private law. Instead the Court has affirmed that
"[p]unishment is a legitimate objective not only of the criminal law
but of the civil law as well. ' 113 The question that arises is whether,
having dispensed with the coherence imparted by corrective justice,
the Court has nonetheless succeeded on some other basis in working
112. In Whiten, the Court summed up the relevant considerations in the following eleven
points:
[Ilt would be helpful if the trial judge's charge to the jury included words to convey an
understanding of the following points, even at the risk of some repetition for emphasis.
(1) Punitive damages are very much the exception rather than the rule, (2) imposed
only if there has been high-handed, malicious, arbitrary or highly reprehensible mis-
conduct that departs to a marked degree from ordinary standards of decent behaviour.
(3) Where they are awarded, punitive damages should be assessed in an amount rea-
sonably proportionate to such factors as the harm caused, the degree of the miscon-
duct, the relative vulnerability of the plaintiff and any advantage or profit gained by
the defendant, (4) having regard to any other fines or penalties suffered by the defen-
dant for the misconduct in question. (5) Punitive damages are generally given only
where the misconduct would otherwise be unpunished or where other penalties are or
are likely to be inadequate to achieve the objectives of retribution, deterrence and
denunciation. (6) Their purpose is not to compensate the plaintiff, but (7) to give a
defendant his or her just dessert (retribution), to deter the defendant and others from
similar misconduct in the future (deterrence), and to mark the community's collective
condemnation (denunciation) of what has happened. (8) Punitive damages are
awarded only where compensatory damages, which to some extent are punitive, are
insufficient to accomplish these objectives, and (9) they are given in an amount that is
no greater than necessary to rationally accomplish their purpose. (10) While normally
the state would be the recipient of any fine or penalty for misconduct, the plaintiff will
keep punitive damages as a "windfall" in addition to compensatory damages. (11)
Judges and juries in our system have usually found that moderate awards of punitive
damages, which inevitably carry a stigma in the broader community, are generally
sufficient.
(2002) 209 D.L.R. (4th) 257, at para. 94.
113. Id. at para. 37.
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out a coherent role for punitive damages in relation to breach of
contract.
The threshold issue is what are the circumstances in which puni-
tive damages may be awarded for breach of contract. On the one
hand, something more than a breach of contract, even if deliberate, is
required. On the other hand, it would have been inappropriate
simply to award the plaintiff in Whiten the insurance proceeds; some
account had to be taken of the abusive manner in which the defen-
dant had dealt with her claim. The defendant insurer's high-handed
treatment of the plaintiff made it liable to the payment of a premium
over and above the amount that would have satisfied its contractual
obligation had it paid promptly. What is the legal basis of the obliga-
tion to pay this premium?
When this issue originally came up in the earlier case in 1989, the
Court had been divided between two alternatives. The minority
favored simply assessing whether the conduct was "deserving of
punishment because of its harsh, vindictive, reprehensible and
malicious nature.""14 The majority feared that such exclusive reliance
on what has been called "the whole gamut of dyslogistic judicial
epithets"" 5 would open the door to subjective judgments on the basis
of emotive adjectives. Although the Court rejected the restrictive
English approach, it was nonetheless sensitive to the institutional
concerns that the House of Lords had articulated. If punitive dam-
ages were to be allowed, they had to operate within a recognizable set
of legal constraints. Once it was detached from the criminal law and
imposed as occasion demanded by the institutions of civil law, pun-
ishment required a legally objective form of justification.
It must never be forgotten that when awarded by a judge or a jury,
a punishment is imposed on a person by a Court by the operation
of the judicial process. What is it that is punished? It surely cannot
be merely conduct of which the Court disapproves, however
strongly the judge may feel. Punishment may not be imposed in a
civilized community without a justification in law. 16
Unwilling to accept the sufficiency of reference to the manner of the
defendant's conduct, the Court formulated an additional substantive
114. Vorvis, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085, at 1107-08.
115. Cassell v. Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027, at 1129 (H.L. 1972).
116. Vorvis, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085, at 1105-06.
[Vol178:55
2003] PUNISHMENT AND DISGORGEMENT AS CONTRACT REMEDIES 97
requirement: to be liable for punitive damages for breach of contract,
the defendant must have committed an actionable wrong." 7
This requirement was satisfied in the Whiten case. The insurer
had not only refused to pay the proceeds due. It had also breached
the contractual duty of good faith it owed to its insured. Although
the duty of good faith and the duty to pay the loss were both contrac-
tual, they were independent of each other. The breach of the duty of
good faith thus constituted the actionable wrong that could trigger an
award of punitive damages.118
This is a laudable attempt to accommodate a punitive function
for private law to the ideal of legality. However, it raises a number of
difficulties that are variants of the same question: why should an
accumulation of actionable wrongs lead to punitive damages rather
than to an accumulation of compensatory damages for the various
wrongs suffered?
The Court assumed that compensation would be exhausted by
payment of the insurance proceeds and that, therefore, any award
above this amount that was based on the defendant's obstructionist
processing of the claim had to be punitive." 9 The Court's specifica-
tion of the defendant's breach of its duty of good faith as a further
actionable wrong shows that this assumption was mistaken on the
Court's own reasoning. For if the defendant's conduct not only
breached the contractual duty to pay the proceeds, but also consti-
tuted the further actionable wrong of breaching the defendant's good
faith obligation as an insurer, then there must be some sum, however
notional, that would provide compensation for that actionable wrong.
Indeed, this is only one of the alternatively available ways of hav-
ing compensatory assessments take care of what the defendant owed
for its high-handed treatment, over and above its liability to pay the
insurance proceeds. Another way flows from the Court's repeated
characterization of the fire insurance policy as a homeowner's "peace
of mind" contract. 120 If the defendant's obstruction of the claim
breached its contractual obligation with regard to the plaintiff's peace
117. That the requirement of actionable wrong is in addition to the requirement of
reprehensible and high-handed conduct is evident from Vorvis, id. at 1108, and from Whiten,
(2002) 209 D.L.R. (4th) 257, at para. 83.
118. Whiten, (2002) 209 D.L.R. (4th) 257, at para. 79-83. As the Court noted, by not
insisting that the actionable wrong be tortious, the Canadian position is more expansive than the
parallel provision of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 255.
119. Whiten, (2002) 209 D.L.R. (4th) 257, at para. 129.
120. Id.
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of mind, then that could have been the subject of a compensatory
assessment. A third way would have been to claim aggravated
damages for the harm that the defendant's outrageous conduct
caused to the plaintiff's feelings and sense of self-worth.12' Thus, even
though the defendant should have been made to pay more than the
insurance proceeds it withheld, the Court's assumption that punitive
damages were therefore necessary was based on its ignoring the
compensatory implications of its own description of good faith and
peace of mind as aspects of the contract.'
This failure to make a comprehensive assessment of the compen-
satory damages leads to another difficulty. In the Court's view,
punitive damages are to be awarded only where compensatory
damages are insufficient to accomplish the punitive purposes. 23 The
Court regards even compensatory damages as forwarding the punitive
objectives of denunciation, retribution, and deterrence, 124 so that the
punitive damages are understood as residual to the compensatory
ones from the standpoint of punishment itself. Punitive damages,
therefore, are additional to compensatory damages without being
independent of them: punitive damages are merely the continuation
of the aspect of punishment already present in the award of compen-
sation. Thus one cannot tell whether or to what extent punitive
damages are needed to supplement the compensatory damages until
all the compensatory damages are in view. The Court regards this
sequencing, in which punitive damages are considered only after
121. In Vorvis, the Court recognized the possibility of awarding aggravated damages for
breach of contract. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085, at 1103. See Bruce Chapman, Punitive Damages as
Aggravated Damages: The Case of Contract, 16 CAN. Bus. L.J. 269 (1990); John Swan, Extended
Damages and Vorvis v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 16 CAN. Bus. L.J. 213,216-
24 (1990).
122. A compensatory claim along one of these lines would have yielded significantly less
than the punitive damages that the plaintiff received. In the case itself the plaintiff was awarded
approximately $318,000 in insurance proceeds, a similar amount in legal costs, and $1 million in
punitive damages. It is inconceivable that compensation for breach of the duty of good faith or
for infringing her contractual interest in peace of mind, or for the aggravated damage, would
have amounted to $1 million. The insurer's duty of good faith in processing the insurance claim
would presumably not have bee n assessed at more than thrice the value of the claim itself. Nor
would her peace of mind about her home have been assessed at more than thrice the value of
the home itself. Nor would the damage to her sense of self-worth have been evaluated at so
much more than the maximum that the Canadian courts allow ($100,000 Canadian dollars in
1978) for nonpecuniary damages in personal injury cases. See Andrews v. Grand & Toy
Alberta, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229, 265; Lindal v. Lindal, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 629, 643-44. Of course, had
the plaintiff been awarded a smaller compensatory amount rather than the large punitive one,
she would not have been able to complain; from the plaintiff's standpoint the punitive award is
always a windfall.
123. Whiten, (2002) 209 D.L.R. (4th) 257. at para. 74, 94, 123.
124. Id. at para. 94.
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compensatory damages are seen to be insufficient, as an important
device for preventing immoderate awards.'2 The consequence of the
Court's insistence that punitive damages are awarded if and only if
compensatory damages are insufficient should be that punitive
damages are unavailable in the absence of a full compensatory
reckoning. 126 Thus, the absence in Whiten of a comprehensive com-
pensatory assessment undermines, according to the Court's own
reasoning, the appropriateness of the award of punitive damages that
the Court approved.
Furthermore, the requirement that punitive damages need to be
triggered by a further actionable wrong is inconsistent with the idea
that punitive damages are to be awarded only if compensatory
damages are insufficient.127  Under this idea, in seeking punitive
damages the plaintiff in Whiten should have claimed compensatory
damages for the defendant's breach of its duty of good faith. But
then the breach of that duty could not have served as the further
actionable wrong in accordance with the requirement that the Court
lays down, for that wrong would have been something for which she
was seeking compensation. She would then need to locate yet
another actionable wrong. However, if that actionable wrong were
another breach of contract, 128 it too would have been something for
which she should have claimed the compensation that would have
prevented it from being regarded as a further actionable wrong, and
so on ad infinitum. The point at which this sequence stops would be
the point at which punitive damages could not be awarded for lack of
an independent actionable wrong to trigger them. It thus turns out
that (at least so long as all the actionable wrongs are breaches of
contract, as in Whiten) were the plaintiff to claim compensatory
damages for all actionable wrongs suffered, then punitive damages
125. Id. at para. 74.
126. In Whiten, there was no consideration of aggravated damages because the plaintiff did
not claim them. Id. at para. 91. But it is odd that the plaintiff could expose the defendant to a
punitive fine simply by not claiming under a compensatory head of damages.
127. Id. at para. 74, 94, 123, 168.
128. Does the requirement of a further actionable wrong apply to all punitive damage
awards or only to those that are consequent on a breach of contract? One would have to
conclude on the basis of other cases that, despite the generality with which the requirement and
its supporting reasons were stated in Vorvis, it does not apply to torts or breaches of fiduciary
duty. See, e.g., Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, at 1158, 1208-11
(punitive damages for defamation). If this is so, the infinite regress would then be broken if one
could reach an independent wrong that was a tort for which punitive damages were appropriate.
But this would still leave untouched the situation in Whiten, where the only actionable wrongs
were, in the Court's analysis, contractual.
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could not be awarded. In other words, the requirement of a further
actionable wrong, in combination with the notion that punitive
damages are given only if compensatory damages are insufficient,
renders impossible the very award that the requirement is supposed
to condition.
Now the idea that punitive damages are awarded only when
compensatory damages are insufficient is itself part of a more com-
prehensive idea that punitive damages are awarded only if all other
penalties, including criminal and regulatory sanctions, have been
taken into account and found to be inadequate to accomplish the
objectives of retribution, deterrence, and denunciation. 129 These
other sanctions are relevant but not a bar to the award of punitive
damages. The Court explains:
The prescribed fine, for example, may be disproportionately small
to the level of outrage the jury wishes to express. The misconduct
in question may be broader than the misconduct proven in evidence
in the criminal or regulatory proceeding. The legislative judgment
fixing the amount of the potential fine may be based on policy con-
siderations other than pure punishment. 130
Thus, the assessment of contract damages can rank as the final
determinant of the sum total of the punitive consequences visited on
the defendant.
This is odd. It will be recalled that the reason for introducing the
requirement of an independent actionable wrong was to prevent the
decision to award punitive damages from being subjective. But on
the issue of the quantum of damages, such subjectivity is allowed
(provided that it is not so egregious as to violate vague notions of
rationality and proportionality). Criminal and regulatory proceed-
ings, which are devoted to punishment, have standard legal con-
straints on subjectivity, such as the absence of common law crimes,
the procedural and evidentiary protections for the accused, and the
prohibition of double jeopardy. But the judge or jury determining the
quantum of punitive damages, operating free of those constraints, can
impose an additional penalty out of a higher feeling of outrage, or on
the basis of conclusions reached on a lower burden of proof, or
through a judgment that the legislated level of punishment was
inadequate. It is little wonder that the dissenting judge in Whiten
warned against "a sort of private criminal law, devoid of all the
129. Whiten, (2002) 209 D.L.R. (4th) 257, at para. 123.
130. Id.
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procedural and evidentiary constraints which have come to be associ-
ated with the criminal justice system. '13'
Moreover, the Court's own view of punishment makes this cava-
lier attitude toward other legal processes more questionable. The
Court specifies the objectives of punishment as retribution, deter-
rence, and denunciation.'32 These objectives are indeterminate in two
ways. First, there is an indeterminacy about what penalty would
achieve any of these objectives considered individually. But, second,
there is also an indeterminacy about what would achieve all of them
in combination. This is because the three objectives rely on consid-
erations that are at least partly inconsistent with each other.13 3 There
can be no single correct view of what penalties or ranges of penalties
would achieve these three divergent objectives. All that a legal
system can hope for is that its institutions of positive law make
determinations that are general, transparent, authoritative, responsi-
ble, and based on the appropriate specialized expertise and institu-
tional competence. One would think that the judge or jury in a
contracts trial would be institutionally the least qualified to decide the
final amount of the defendant's punishment. To have the judge or
jury determine as part of a contracts case whether other institutions
specifically charged with punishing have indicated the appropriate
outrage, had access to adequate evidence, or have legislated the
appropriate range of punishment does not seem consistent with a
well-ordered legal system.
These reflections bring us back to the criticisms of punitive dam-
ages voiced by the House of Lords, that punitive damages are institu-
tionally misplaced in private law.M It should be apparent that the
recent Canadian developments have not satisfactorily obviated those
131. Id. at para. 158. A notable feature of Whiten is that, despite the Court's elaborate
treatment of rationality and proportionality, there is little indication of what placed this specific
punitive damages award of $1 million within the acceptable range. Aside from observing that
the judges below thought that this sum was not unreasonable and that there had been an
analogous increase in the size of the punitive damages award for defamation, the Court twice
mentioned the fact-which it acknowledged to be irrelevant under the test of rationality that it
was formulating-that the award was less than two times the total of compensatory damages
and legal costs. Id. at para. 4, 132.
132. Id. at para. 68, 143.
133. Chapman & Trebilcock, supra note 93 (cited in Whiten, (2002) 209 D.L.R. (4th) 257, at
para. 43). For example, as Chapman and Trebilcock observe, deterrence would favor and
retribution would oppose grossing up the penalty to reflect the fact that the probability of its
enforcement is less than one. Id. at 797-98. Moreover, the recent case of A v. Botttrill shows
that denunciation can be considered a wider idea than the more purely punitive goals of
deterrence and retribution. 2002 U.K.P.C. 44 (Sept. 6, 2002).
134. Cassell v. Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027, at 1087 (H.L.).
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criticisms. Nor, having rejected the approach consonant with correc-
tive justice, has the Supreme Court of Canada yet established a
plausible approach for punitive damages in the contracts context.
Perhaps future elaboration will alleviate the inadequacies of the
Court's present jurisprudence. Or perhaps, with the passage of time,
these inadequacies will be recognized as the inevitable consequence
of the incoherence of introducing punitive objectives into contract
law's framework of corrective justice.
CONCLUSION
Starting with the basic idea of corrective justice, that the remedy
corrects the injustice suffered by the plaintiff at the defendant's hand,
this Paper has examined the significance of various conceptions of
contract damages. Its conclusions can be briefly stated. Despite the
contentions of Fuller and Perdue, expectation damages are justified
as compensation for the promisor's breach of contract in accordance
with corrective justice. Expectation damages represent the value of
the promisor's performance; the promisee's entitlement to this
performance is illuminated by the Kantian account of contract, which
construes the doing of the contractually required act as the content of
the promisee's entitlement. Kant's insistence that "what I acquire
directly by a contract is not an external thing but rather his deed" 135
also indicates the deficiency of requiring the promisor to disgorge the
gains from the breach. The plaintiff is entitled to the disgorged gains
only if the gains came from the alienation of the plaintiff's property;
the alienation of property, however, is not a concept applicable to the
promisor's failure to perform a contractually obligatory act. Nor does
it make sense to regard disgorgement (or, as Fuller and Perdue
thought, expectation damages) as punitive in nature, in view of the
categorical distinction between liability and punishment. Moreover,
as the Canadian experience shows, even when damages are expressly
punitive, they seem incapable of being coherently integrated into the
fabric of contractual liability.
At the heart of this argument lies the identification of the nature
of the contractual entitlement. For corrective justice, a right and its
correlative duty are the legal concepts that mark the doing and
suffering of an injustice. Unless the contractual right is properly
identified, the law's interest in awarding expectation damages be-
135. KANT, supra note 30, at 424 [6:273-74].
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comes obscure, as the classic discussion by Fuller and Perdue shows.
Conversely, the nature of the contractual right has implications for
how disgorgement is to be viewed. In particular, the identification of
the contractual entitlement with the performance of an act reveals the
inappositeness of assimilating contract breach to the alienation of
property, and thus also the inappositeness of disgorgement.
From the standpoint of corrective justice, private law is a distinct
form of practical reason, in which justification reflects the correlative
situation of the parties as doer and sufferer of the same injustice.
One-sided considerations, no matter how appealing, such as that the
party in breach should disgorge profits made from its wrong or should
be punished for its malevolent conduct, do not conform to this
correlativity. Such considerations can be incorporated only if private
law is willing to countenance unfairness as between the parties and
the disturbance of the law's internal coherence. Perhaps sensing this,
the common law traditionally did not use damage awards to punish
the breaching party or to force disgorgement of the gains from
breach. In recent decades both courts and commentators have been
willing to reconsider. If the argument presented here is correct, the
law has to that extent become more flexible but less just.

